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ABSTRACT 
In the context of school psychology, students’ cognitive abilities such as intelligence, 
attention, and executive functions are often assessed for diagnostic classification purposes 
(e.g., intellectual disability or giftedness; the presence of an attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder [ADHD]). There are an increasing number of tests measuring these abilities, raising 
the question of whether different tests aimed at measuring the same psychological attribute 
yield comparable results. Most previous studies have addressed this question using group-
level analyses (i.e., correlations among tests). Yet, research investigating whether different 
tests yield comparable scores for individuals, that is, scores that lead to the same 
classification, is sparse. This is surprising given that individual-level comparability is 
essential, as diagnostic classification is most often based on cut-off scores. Thus, the main 
goal of the present dissertation was to shed light on such individual-level comparability with 
findings from three studies. Studies I and II revealed that different intelligence test scores 
were generally highly correlated on the group level, but individual-level comparability was 
not satisfactory. Specifically, in Study I, the 95% confidence interval (CI) of two test scores 
obtained from different tests overlapped in only about 60% of all cases. In Study II, the 95% 
CI of intelligence scores obtained from the same test (Full-Scale IQs vs. Screening IQs) did 
overlap in 74–99% of all cases. In both studies, comparability decreased toward the tails of 
the IQ distribution, the very ranges in which diagnostic questions most often arise in practice. 
Study III revealed that scores of attention and executive functions obtained in parent 
questionnaires did not correlate substantially with those obtained in performance-based 
measures. Moreover, only scores from parent questionnaires and not those from performance-
based measures were associated with an ADHD diagnosis. Possible approaches for dealing 
with and enhancing individual-level comparability are discussed. The focus thereby lies on 
two aspects that were identified to be the most prominent sources of incomparability: different 
theoretical groundings of tests and measurement error. 
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	Introduction 
In the field of school psychology, the abilities of children and adolescents are 
frequently assessed following two general goals: One is the identification of strengths and 
difficulties of students and how best to support them during their school career. The second 
purpose is the classification of students’ abilities into discrete categories (e.g., intellectually 
disabled, normal, or gifted; criteria for a diagnosis are met or not met) to determine if a child 
is eligible for special education. The second purpose is often necessary because the nature of 
diagnoses is discrete or dichotomous (American Psychiatric Association, 2013; World Health 
Organization [WHO], 2018) and because public policies often bind financial resource 
allocation for special education to the presence of a diagnosis. Yet, it may raise an ethical 
conflict in psychologists, as they know that behavior is complex and falls on a continuum 
(Weissman & Debow, 2003). This dilemma can be eased by using quantitative, age-
standardized psychometric test procedures such as intelligence tests, neuropsychological test 
batteries, and standardized behavior-rating scales. Such tests provide unambiguous scores that 
facilitate the categorization of a child or adolescent’s abilities according to prespecified 
(quantitative) criteria and cut-off scores, which in turn increase the objectivity of diagnostic 
decisions that follow a test score. Whereas there is no universal definition of abnormal test 
performance, it is often referred to as the standard deviation from the mean in order to define 
a strength or an impairment (e.g., Binder, Iverson, & Brooks, 2009; Heyanka, Holster, & 
Golden, 2013). By using a standardized test and cut-off scores, the psychologist’s 
responsibility is slightly shifted away from the classification itself toward the process of 
selecting an appropriate test, administering it correctly, and interpreting results according to 
the current state of research and test standards (Diagnostik- und Testkuratorium, 2018; 
International Test Commission, 2001) and in line with ethical principles (e.g., American 
Psychological Association, 2017). Although not binding, these guidelines inter alia ask test 
developers to provide evidence of the test’s psychometric properties (e.g., objectivity, 
MEASUREMENT OF COGNITIVE ABILITIES 1
	reliability, and validity), and they ask test administrators to select, apply, and interpret tests 
correctly and with consideration of their limits (e.g., restricted reliability or validity). To act 
accordingly, school psychologists must be familiar or, even better, experienced with the tests 
at their disposal. Yet, the number and diversity of available tests has drastically increased, 
making it challenging for school psychologists to be familiar with or have access to them all. 
An essential question therefore is whether different tests that aim at measuring the same 
psychological attribute yield comparable results for individuals. Especially when 
psychometric test scores are used for classification, such comparability is vital to ensure that 
the classification or a given diagnosis depends on an individual’s true ability rather than on 
test selection or any other construct-irrelevant variance (i.e., measurement error).  
There is a large body of research investigating how tests measuring the same 
psychological attribute correlate, but such group-level analyses cannot be directly transferred 
to the individual level. That is, a high correlation of two test scores does not imply that these 
test scores will result in the same classification and diagnostic conclusion. Hence, research is 
needed to gain a more profound, multifaceted, and practically relevant understanding of the 
comparability of test scores. The present research therefore was aimed at investigating 
whether psychometric tests that purport to measure the same psychological attribute yield 
comparable results for individuals, that is, results that lead to the same classification. 
Although this is relevant to the measurement of all psychological attributes, the focus of the 
three studies included in this dissertation lies on the comparability of tests measuring 
cognitive abilities, that is, intelligence (Studies I and II), as well as attention and executive 
functions (Study III). These particular cognitive abilities were chosen because of their high 
relevance for real-life outcomes (e.g., academic and occupational success) as well as their 
pivotal role in school psychology (Benson et al., 2019; Moffitt et al., 2011; Roth et al., 2015). 
To embed the three studies theoretically, the role of intelligence, attention, and executive 
functions in school psychology as well as the most prominent construct theories are 
MEASUREMENT OF COGNITIVE ABILITIES 2
	highlighted first. Second, characteristics that affect measurement accuracy and that may vary 
across tests measuring the same attribute, hence threatening test comparability, are revealed. 
Results from the three studies are presented and discussed. They form the basis of a general 
discussion on how practitioners and researchers can deal with limited individual-level 
comparability and how this comparability might be increased in the long term.  
Theoretical Background 
General intelligence is defined as a broad mental capacity to reason, solve problems, 
comprehend complex ideas, and learn quickly (Gottfredson, 1997). Binet and Simon (1904) 
developed the first major and individually administered intelligence test over a century ago to 
predict interindividual differences in scholastic achievement. Since then, the frequency and 
diagnostic purposes of intelligence assessment as well as the number and diversity of 
available measurement instruments have increased drastically (S. Goldstein, Princiotta, & 
Naglieri, 2015). Most well-established tests are individually administered, and performance 
based and provide age-standardized general intelligence scores (i.e., IQs). Today, intelligence 
is the most frequently assessed attribute among school psychologists (Benson et al., 2019), 
This may be explained by the fact, that numerous studies have shown the association between 
IQ and educational success (Deary, Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007; Roth et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, many diagnoses that are relevant in the field of school psychology can only be 
given in relation to a standardized intelligence test score. In this context, intelligence is 
assessed to identify intellectual disability or giftedness, which entitles an individual to special 
education (Bergeron, Floyd, & Shands, 2008; Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of 
Education, 2007). Intellectual disability or giftedness is defined as two or more standard 
deviations below or above the mean, respectively, obtained on normed and standardized tests. 
The most current versions of the International Classification of Diseases for Mortality and 
Morbidity Statistic (ICD-11; WHO, 2018) and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) further require ruling out 
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	the presence of an intellectual disability as an alternative explanation for symptoms associated 
with certain developmental disorders such as attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), 
language, or learning disorders. Yet, the ICD-11 will not come into effect until January 2022. 
The current valid version, the ICD-10, even requires a significant discrepancy (usually 1.2 to 
1.5 SDs) between below-average school performance (e.g., reading, writing, or mathematical 
skills) and IQ for the diagnosis of a learning disorder (WHO, 1990). It is therefore crucial to 
have very accurate intelligence measures to ensure that the presence or absence of a diagnosis 
does not vary with the use of different tests.  
Many intelligence researchers have strived to meet this challenge: The field of 
(psychometric) intelligence is one of the most prominent and successful research fields in 
psychology (Stern & Neubauer, 2016). Nevertheless, controversial debates and theories about 
the psychometric structure of intelligence have persisted (e.g., Beaujean & Benson, 2019a, 
2019b; Gignac, 2008; Kovacs & Conway, 2019; Stern & Neubauer, 2016). Major 
controversies are whether the general intelligence factor truly exists, whether intelligence is 
unidimensional (e.g., two-factor theory; Spearman, 1927) or multidimensional (e.g., gf-gc 
theory; Cattell, 1987), and if it is multidimensional, what type of hierarchical model best 
represents the structure of abilities. Nevertheless, most contemporary tests give a nod to the 
Cattel–Horn–Carroll (CHC) theory of cognitive abilities (McGrew, 1997, 2005, 2009) to 
provide a theoretical grounding. CHC theory integrates theories from Cattell (1941), Horn and 
Cattell (1966), and Carroll (1993). In CHC theory, intelligence is modeled as a 
multidimensional construct consisting of a number of different abilities that are hierarchically 
structured on three strata: A general intelligence factor g is on the top Stratum III, broad 
abilities are on Stratum II, and more narrow abilities are on Stratum I. Tests relating to CHC 
theory usually provide not only a Full-Scale IQ (FSIQ) representing g but also a varying 
number of factor index scores (group factors) representing the more specific broad abilities 
and subtests representing more narrow abilities. The fact that most contemporary intelligence 
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	tests relate to CHC theory strengthens the assumption of interchangeability of IQs that are 
derived from different test batteries. However, none of the tests include the measurement of 
all broad and narrow abilities. Therefore, the specific operationalizations of general 
intelligence still differ among tests (Beaujean & Benson, 2019b). That is, IQs are calculated 
based on different sets of subtests that vary in number, task format, heterogeneity of content, 
and their g loadings. These characteristics of composite scores have an influence on the 
accuracy of composites (Farmer, Floyd, Reynolds, & Berlin, 2019; Jensen & Weng, 1994). 
According to a thorough investigation by Farmer et al., the most accurate composites are 
those derived from numerous (at least 4 but up to 12) highly g-loaded and diverse subtests. 
Especially for IQs that are based on fewer than four subtests, inadequate content sampling 
poses a risk of loss of accuracy of IQs and may therefore reduce comparability (Farmer et al., 
2019; Floyd, Clark, & Shadish, 2008). Nevertheless, as time efficiency plays an important 
role in diagnostic contexts, an increasing number of intelligence tests provide a Screening IQ 
(ScrIQ) as an index for general intelligence in addition to the FSIQ. The ScrIQ is usually 
composed of only two subtests that target the broad abilities of fluid and crystallized 
intelligence (Grob, Gygi, & Hagmann-von Arx, 2019; Grob & Hagmann-von Arx, 2018; 
Hagmann-von Arx & Grob, 2014). 
Numerous studies have confirmed that IQs derived from different intelligence test 
batteries as well as FSIQs and ScrIQs from the same test battery are highly correlated (e.g., 
Allen, Stolberg, Thaler, Sutton, & Mayfield, 2014; Baum, Shear, Howe, & Bishop, 2015; 
Grob & Hagmann-von Arx, 2018; Hagmann-von Arx & Grob, 2014). This is seen as an 
indication of convergent validity, that is, that the test scores represent the same constructs 
(Neukrug & Fawcett, 2014). However, as described above, this does not automatically lead to 
the conclusion that two different tests measuring general intelligence would render 
comparable results for the same individual. Only two studies so far have addressed this 
question of individual-level comparability by investigating in how many cases the 90% 
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	confidence intervals (CIs) of FSIQs derived from different tests overlapped. These studies 
found overlap in 64–76% when investigating schoolchildren (Floyd et al., 2008; Hagmann-
von Arx, Lemola, & Grob, 2018), implying that decisions and diagnoses based on a single test 
are of questionable validity for a fourth to a third of tested children. As this is highly relevant 
for the validity of test diagnostic, it is crucial to better understand what threatens individual-
level comparability of intelligence scores and how it might be enhanced. To this end, 
investigations are needed of individual-level comparability for the whole age range in which 
school psychology questions arise (age 4 to 20 years), not only for IQs and factor scores 
obtained in different tests, but also for FSIQs and ScrIQs obtained within the same test.  
Unlike intelligence, the constructs of attention and executive functions have only 
recently gained increased consideration by school psychologists. Different theories exist to 
describe the construct of attention (Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, & Kellam, 1991; 
Posner & Rothbart, 2007; van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). These theories differ with regard 
to the specific attention components that are included in their models (e.g., alertness, 
sustained and executive attention). Yet, they have in common that attention is modeled as a 
multicomponent construct that contains bottom-up as well as top-down processes (Katsuki & 
Constantinidis, 2014; Zelazo et al., 2013). The latter show great overlap with the construct of 
executive functions, which are widely understood to be a heterogeneous set of higher order 
cognitive processes that are crucial for goal-directed, purposeful behavior or nonhabitual 
responses in novel, complex, and challenging situations. Classic components of executive 
functions are updating, inhibition, and shifting of attention (Miyake et al., 2000).  
Whereas these theories mainly focus on cognitive aspects, recent theories include 
attentional processes as well as executive functions as part of a more comprehensive system 
of self-regulation that encompasses a complex and entangled set of biological, emotional, 
behavioral, and cognitive control and regulation processes (Blair & Raver, 2012, 2015; 
Calkins & Williford, 2009). The increased consideration of attention and executive functions 
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	in school psychology might be explained by three main circumstances: First, these constructs 
were shown to be substantially associated with developmental aspects that encompass not 
only school readiness, learning, and academic achievement but also physical and mental 
health later in adulthood (Best, Miller, & Naglieri, 2011; Blair & Razza, 2007; Moffitt et al., 
2011; Roebers, Röthlisberger, Cimeli, Michel, & Neuenschwander, 2011). Second, 
intervention studies have found promising effects, suggesting that attention and executive 
functions are malleable and may be improved with specific trainings (Diamond, 2012). Third, 
deficits of attention and executive functions are core symptoms of ADHD, a 
neurodevelopmental disorder with a relatively high and stable prevalence of 5% (Polanczyk, 
Willcutt, Salum, Kieling, & Rohde, 2014). This disorder is persistent across settings and is 
associated with various functional impairments, including learning problems, scholastic 
underachievement, and social withdrawal (Barkley, 1997; Maedgen & Carlson, 2000; 
Polanczyk et al., 2014; Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone, & Pennington, 2005). Meeting criteria 
for an ADHD diagnosis makes children eligible for special education in Switzerland and 
many other countries worldwide (Polanczyk et al., 2014; Swiss Conference of Cantonal 
Ministers of Education, 2007). Hence, it is crucial to develop tests that measure attention and 
executive functions accurately, that is, reliably and validly. Yet, because the processes of 
attention, executive functions, and self-regulation are intertwined, it is difficult to disentangle 
them for measurement and diagnostic purposes. Therefore, performance-based tests often 
include tasks or questions measuring both attention and executive functions (Drechsler, 2007). 
Furthermore, questionnaires or rating scales that measure these constructs often include 
emotional and behavioral aspects of self-regulation as well (e.g., Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & 
Kenworthy, 2000). Hence, other than in the realm of intelligence, different tests measuring 
attention and executive functions are seen as heterogeneous. They vary with regard to 
measurement type or method (e.g., performance-based or questionnaires), content (e.g., 
cognitive, behavioral, emotional), and type of index score they provide (a general attention or 
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	executive function index, analogous to the FSIQ, and/or specific ability index scores, 
analogous to factor indices or single subtest scores in intelligence tests). As a consequence of 
these variations, correlations among different tests are moderate for the same measurement 
types (Caye, Machado, & Rohde, 2017; van der Ven, Kroesbergen, Boom, & Leseman, 2013) 
and rather low for different measurement types (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2013). However, 
there are studies showing that questionnaires as well as performance-based measures are 
useful for identifying impairments in children with ADHD (Fried, Hirshfeld-Becker, Petty, 
Batchelder, & Biederman, 2015; Gioia, Isquith, Kenworthy, & Barton, 2002) Yet, in the 
context of classifying a child or adolescent with ADHD, it is crucial to know if different types 
of tests reveal a suspected impairment to a similar degree in the same sample. 
Like all psychological attributes, intelligence, attention, and executive functions are 
latent constructs that are not directly observable. This has two implications that are relevant 
for test comparability: First, test developers must rely on a specific theoretical model for test 
construction. As shown above, these theoretical models, or the operationalization of the same 
theoretical model, may vary across tests and therefore limit comparability of test scores. 
Second, psychometric test scores, whether they stem from performance-based tests or rating 
scales, are approximations and not pure representations of an individual’s true (theoretically 
conceptualized) ability. They therefore always contain measurement error (e.g., Shultz, 
Whitney, & Zickar, 2014).  
Measurement error limits a test’s accuracy (i.e., reliability and validity) and thus the 
comparability across test scores. Sources of measurement error are manifold. They may stem 
from limitations in test construction or test administration. It is assumed that measurement 
error can be reduced, yet not eliminated, by following test standards and guidelines (National 
Research Council, 2002). Therefore, test manuals should always contain reliability 
coefficients as indicator of measurement accuracy (Diagnostik- und Testkuratorium, 2018; 
International Test Commission, 2001). Reliability coefficients are directly relevant for test use 
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	and interpretation, as they build the basis for calculating a test’s standard error of 
measurement, which is essential for the optional calculation of the CI around a standardized 
test score. The lower the reliability coefficient is, the wider the CI gets. According to Evers 
(2001a), psychologists should use tests that have reliability coefficients of at least .90 when 
making high-stakes diagnostic decisions. However, there are different types of reliability 
coefficients, each estimating a different source of measurement error. The most common 
reliability coefficients are (a) internal consistencies (e.g., Cronbach’s α or split-half 
reliability), which consider error of content sampling that is associated with a weak theoretical 
grounding (Beaujean & Benson, 2019b; Farmer et al., 2019), (b) test–retest reliability 
coefficients, which consider transient error, that is, temporary states of an individual (e.g., 
changes in mood or information processing efficiency over time), as well as environmental 
random circumstances (Schmidt, Le, & Ilies, 2003), and (c) interrater reliability coefficients, 
which consider examiner influences that may interfere with an examinee’s test performance 
or rating result (e.g., inappropriate help, different expectations of or biased perspectives on an 
individual’s performance; Caye et al., 2017; McDermott, Watkins, & Rhoad, 2014).  
Yet there are also sources of measurement error that cannot be captured by these 
reliability coefficients. Such measurement error might, for instance, stem from different 
theoretical groundings that direct content sampling (Beaujean & Benson, 2019b; Shultz et al., 
2014). In addition, tests may differ in standardization samples and therefore produce culture 
or cohort effects. Moreover, differences in task format (e.g., verbal or nonverbal, paper-and-
pencil or computer based; Floyd et al., 2008) may interact with conditions and characteristics 
of individual examinees (e.g., language, or motor skills) and hence cause construct-irrelevant 
variability that differs between tests. If these sources of measurement error are not taken into 
account when building or interpreting test scores, they may lead to misdiagnosis. 
The majority of well-established intelligence tests provide a 95% CI for FSIQs and 
ScrIQs as well as factor scores. The CI is usually based on overall internal consistency 
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	coefficients, which generally exceed the desired minimum of .90. By contrast, reliability 
coefficients of attention and executive function tests are often lower than .90 (e.g., Soveri, 
Lehtonen, Karlsson, Lukasik, & Antfolk, 2018; Syväoja et al., 2015). Nevertheless, many 
tests measuring attention and executive functions do not provide CIs. When provided, the CI 
should be used for test interpretation instead of the exact test score, as it takes measurement 
error into account. Yet, it should be kept in mind that even with the interpretation of CIs, only 
one of many types of measurement error is considered (e.g., content sampling).  
To sum up, different theoretical assumption as well as measurement error may limit 
the comparability of test scores, especially if the latter is not adequately taken into account by 
using reliability coefficients and interpreting CIs instead of the exact test score. Because 
group-level comparisons do not directly transfer to individual, diagnostic settings, more 
research is needed to better understand to what extent test scores representing the same 
psychological attribute render comparable results for individuals. 
The Studies 
The overarching goal of this research was to gain a more profound understanding of 
comparability among test scores purporting to represent the same psychological attribute. The 
focus was on intelligence, attention, and executive functions given their relevance for school 
psychology. The present dissertation encompasses three studies that shed light on this 
question from different perspectives and with different study designs. Studies I and II aimed 
at investigating individual-level comparability of different intelligence scores in mainly 
typically developing individuals. For this purpose, we used two different approaches: the first 
was to examine whether different IQs of an individual lie within the same classification range 
(i.e., nominal intelligence level such as average, below or above average). The second was to 
examine whether CIs plotted around the different IQs overlapped. The CIs were calculated on 
the basis of the overall internal consistency coefficients (i.e., Cronbach’s α or split-half 
reliability, as indicated in the test manuals) with the standard error of estimate and the 
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	estimated true score, which entails a correction toward the mean. Furthermore, possible 
predictors of IQ differences (e.g., age, native language, IQ level, and order of test 
administration) were investigated in both studies. In Study II, we additionally varied the 
reliability coefficients used for the calculation of CIs to explore whether comparability can be 
enhanced by taking other sources of measurement error into account. The main distinction 
between the two studies was that in Study I, we investigated comparability of FSIQs and 
verbal and nonverbal factor scores among different test batteries (between-test comparison), 
and in Study II we contrasted FSIQs and ScrIQs from the same test battery (within-test 
comparison).  
Study III focused on attention and executive functions and differed from the other 
studies not only with regard to the investigated constructs but also with regard to the study 
design: Given that attention and executive functions are assessed via either questionnaires 
(rating scales) or performance-based measures, we investigated the comparability of the two 
measurement methods. Whereas intelligence tests usually differentiate quite well across the 
entire IQ distribution and can be applied for detecting difficulties as well as strengths, tests of 
attention and executive functions are often constructed to detect difficulties and likely show a 
ceiling effect with typically developing samples. Therefore, we investigated children with an 
expected deficit in attention and executive functions, namely, children with ADHD, and a 
control group of typically developing children who were matched with regard to age and 
gender. The main question was to investigate whether both measurement methods would 
reveal the expected difficulties in the ADHD group. Because the investigated measures of 
attention and executive functions do not provide a CI for the obtained score, we did not 
consider the overlap of CI as an index of comparability. Last, impairments of motor skills 
were further investigated in Study III, because of their high comorbidity in ADHD. Yet, 
motor skills are not the focus of the present thesis and will not be further discussed in the 
following. 
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	Summary of Study Results 
In Study I “The comparability of intelligence test results: Group- and individual-level 
comparisons of seven intelligence tests”, we investigated whether participants aged 4–20 
years obtained comparable IQs on different well-established intelligence tests, that is, the 
Intelligence and Development Scales–2 (IDS-2; Grob & Hagmann-von Arx, 2018) and the 
German adaptations of the Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scales–Fifth Edition (SB5; Grob et al., 
2019), the Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales (RIAS; Hagmann-von Arx & Grob, 
2014), the Snijders-Oomen Nonverbal Intelligence Test 6-40 (Tellegen, Laros, & Petermann, 
2012), the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Third Edition (von Aster, Neubauer, & Horn, 
2006), the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children–Fourth Edition (Petermann & 
Petermann, 2011), and the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence–Third 
Edition (Petermann, 2009). All of these tests are either explicitly based on or relate to CHC 
theory. As expected, findings indicate mostly substantial correlations between IQs. When 
investigating whether the specific IQs of each individual fell within the same nominal 
category (e.g., below or above average) or whether the CIs of their obtained IQs overlapped, 
we found that this was true overall for only 62% of all comparisons. IQs tended to be higher 
for tests with older standardization years. We found no systematic effect of age or native 
language on IQ differences. Yet, comparability decreased toward the tails of the IQ 
distribution. That is, for individuals who scored in the above- or below-average range on at 
least one intelligence test, comparability decreased to less than 50% on both criteria (overlap 
of CIs and correspondence of nominal category). Similar patterns appeared for the individual-
level comparability of verbal and nonverbal intelligence factor scores. 
In Study II “Limited individual-level comparability of IQs within three test batteries: 
Impact on external validity, some explanations, and possible solutions”, we investigated 
whether FSIQs and ScrIQs obtained from the same test battery were comparable on the group 
and individual level. The included test batteries were the IDS-2, RIAS, and SB5, which 
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	provide FSIQs as well as ScrIQs and in total cover a large age span from early childhood to 
late adulthood. We found that despite high group-level comparability (correlations and mean 
differences), individual-level comparability (correspondence of nominal category and 
overlapping CIs) was not always satisfactory, especially for younger children as well as 
toward the tails of the IQ distribution. When differences between the FSIQ and ScrIQ were 
high, FSIQs tended to predict school grades better than ScrIQs. Last, when internal CIs were 
calculated on the basis of either age- and IQ-specific internal consistency or test–retest 
reliability coefficients instead of overall internal consistency coefficients, CIs were enlarged 
from 6–15 IQ points to 8–30 IQ points. Accordingly, the overlap of CIs increased from an 
average of 74–99% to an average of 94–100%.  
In Study III “Multimethod assessment of attention, executive functions, and motor 
skills in children with and without ADHD: Children’s performance and parents’ perceptions”, 
our main focus was to investigate whether parents’ perceptions assessed with questionnaires 
(Conners 3; Lidzba, Christiansen, & Drechsler, 2013) and performance-based measures 
(CANTAB; Fray, Robbins, & Sahakian, 1996) revealed comparable results when assessing 
attention and executive functions in children with and without ADHD aged 6–13 years. 
Results revealed that parent questionnaires and performance-based measures were barely 
comparable. That is, the two measurement methods did not correlate significantly. Moreover, 
parent questionnaires but not performance-based measures revealed lower mean values and a 
higher number of children showing an impairment in the ADHD group. Parent-reported 
difficulties but not performance-based scores of attention and executive functions were related 
to an ADHD diagnosis. 
Discussion 
The goal of the three studies included in this dissertation was to gain a more 
comprehensive knowledge of the comparability of test scores representing intelligence, 
attention, and executive functions. Studies I and II had a similar study design and were in fact 
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	consecutive. Therefore, findings from these two studies are discussed first, before integrating 
results of all three studies to derive options for research and practice to deal with or enhance 
comparability of test scores. 
Studies I and II both revealed that despite high correlations of intelligence scores, 
comparability on the individual level (correspondence of nominal category and overlap of 
CIs) was not satisfactory. Moreover, the magnitude of IQ differences and individual-level 
comparability was lower toward the tails of the IQ distribution. This was found when 
comparing FSIQs and nonverbal and verbal factor indexes from different test batteries (Study 
I) as well as when comparing FSIQs and ScrIQs from the same test battery (Study II). 
Notably, the tails of the IQ distributions are the specific ranges where diagnostic questions 
most often arise (e.g., intellectual disability or giftedness). When examining possible 
explanations for and sources of IQ differences, the only systematic influence (other than IQ 
level) was age, as found in Study II. Although several possible influences could not be 
investigated, the thorough integration of results from both studies allows for making 
assumptions about the role of between-test variability (e.g., differences in standardization 
sample) and specific test score characteristics (e.g., number, g loadings, and content of 
subtests included) in test comparability. That is, because in Study II, unlike in Study I, 
between-test variability was ruled out completely, and transient error was held to a minimum. 
Thereby, individual-level comparability was indeed remarkably higher in Study II compared 
to Study I. Yet, individual-level comparability was still unsatisfactory. We therefore 
hypothesized that characteristics of test scores that systematically vary between FSIQs and 
ScrIQs (number, g loadings, and content of subtests) have influenced the accuracy of scores in 
a way that reduces individual-level comparability. This is in line with previous research 
revealing that the most accurate composites are those derived from numerous (at least four), 
diverse, and highly g-loaded subtests (Farmer et al., 2019). However, more research would be 
needed to estimate the influence of such characteristics on individual-level comparability. 
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	Furthermore, we found that comparability was generally lower among intelligence scores 
obtained in different tests (Study I). This leads to the hypothesis that construct-irrelevant 
variance between tests might reduce comparability in addition to differences in test score 
composition. This assumption is supported by the finding from Study I that, in line with the 
Flynn effect (Flynn, 1987, 2009), IQs were higher for tests with older standardization years. 
Moreover, it is probable that unsystematic (transient) error reduces comparability among 
scores obtained in different test batteries.  
Finally, both studies concluded that CIs based on overall internal consistency 
coefficients lead to an overestimation of test score accuracy for diagnostic classification, 
because a large amount of measurement error is neglected. As demonstrated in Study II, IQ- 
and age-specific internal consistencies or test–retest reliabilities might better reflect accuracy 
of intelligence scores when used for individual classification purposes.  
In line with previous studies, and unlike for intelligence found in Studies I and II, 
parent questionnaires and performance-based measures of attention and executive functions 
did not correlate significantly in Study III. Whereas previous studies have shown that both 
measurement methods could reveal difficulties in ADHD children (Fried et al., 2015; Gioia et 
al., 2002), results from our study show that when both measurement methods were 
administered within the same sample, only questionnaire scores differentiated between 
children with and without ADHD. Therefore, the two measurement methods were not deemed 
comparable for group comparisons or for the individual diagnostic setting. There are three 
possible explanations for this finding: First, the two measurement methods may not fully 
measure the same underlying construct: Whereas the Conners 3 questionnaires yield two 
general scores of attention and executive functions but involve questions targeting behavioral 
and emotional aspects, the CANTAB performance-based tasks differentiate between several 
subcomponents and exclusively target cognitive processes. Yet, it must be noted that the 
theoretical background of the Conners 3 as well as other questionnaires remains somewhat 
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	unspecific (Drechsler & Steinhausen, 2013; Lidzba et al., 2013). For instance, the authors of 
the Conners 3 scales explained that these would measure "the consequences of an inextricable 
conglomeration of different attention and inhibition processes” (Lidzba et al., 2013, p. 53). 
Although performance-based measures of attention and executive functions do not 
consistently rely on the same theoretical framework, like intelligence does often on CHC 
theory, they often specify targeted components more explicitly (Fray et al., 1996; Grob & 
Hagmann-von Arx, 2018; Jäger & Horn, 2007).  
Second, CANTAB tasks, as for most performance-based measures of attention and 
executive functions, usually have reliability coefficients that are < .90 and often even < .70 
(Soveri et al., 2018; Syväoja et al., 2015) These are considered sufficient to good for research 
purposes on the group level but rather insufficient for individual diagnostic decisions (Evers, 
2001b). This issue might not only (partially) explain the incomparability between tests but 
also reduce the utility of such performance-based measures for diagnostic purposes. Barkley 
(2019) even encouraged diagnosticians to refrain from administering performance-based tests 
for the diagnosis of ADHD, unless their usefulness is proven. However, it may still be 
essential for diagnosticians to know the children’s performance in a standardized test situation 
in addition to the symptoms reported by parents. This is because of the third possible 
explanation of incomparability, namely, that questionnaire scores are likely to be biased by 
the raters’ expectations as well as their cultural background (Caye et al., 2017; Thorell et al., 
2018). For example, findings from a cross-cultural study showed that differences on the 
Conners 3 scales were sometimes large enough for a child to be classified as being within the 
normal range (t < 60) in one country and impaired (t > 70) in another (Thorell et al., 2018).  
Overall, to enhance diagnostic utility of tests measuring attention and executive 
functions, first a clear explanation of the specific theoretical framework the tests are based on 
would help practitioners better understand possibly diverging results between the two test 
methods. Second, and similar to intelligence scores, measurement error should be taken into 
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	account by providing and interpreting CIs around the obtained test scores. Further research 
should investigate whether measurement error is higher in the vicinity of cut-off scores for 
tests measuring attention and executive functions, as was found for intelligence tests in 
Studies I and II. If this is the case, measurement error for individuals who score in these 
ranges is more likely to lead to classification error (American Educational Research 
Association, American Psychological Association, & National Council on Measurement in 
Education, 2014). Our suggestion from Studies I and II to take these circumstances into 
account by providing conditional reliabilities and standard errors (e.g., age- and IQ-specific 
coefficients) would then apply to tests measuring attention and executive functions too. Third, 
future test construction approaches may provide more accurate performance-based tests to 
overcome described issues (e.g., lack of diagnostic utility due to reduced reliability). 
However, independent of what tests are provided from test development and research, 
test administrators always bear “the ultimate responsibility for appropriate test use and 
interpretation” (American Educational Research Association, American Psychological 
Association, & National Council on Measurement in Education, 2014, p. 141). It is important 
to keep this in mind, because even though tasks and tests can be of high relevance for research 
focusing on group comparisons, the same tests do not necessarily fulfill the criteria to be 
applied for individual diagnostic purposes. Therefore, test administrators always need to 
"know what their tests can do and act accordingly” (Weiner, 1989, p. 829). To take this 
responsibility, test administrators need to be well trained and informed about the nature and 
possible limitations of particular psychometric tests. They should rely not only on test 
manuals but also on actual research and test reviews that provide information about the 
diagnostic utility and limitations of tests (Diagnostik- und Testkuratorium, 2018). If they are 
trained well enough, and if test manuals or independent research provides sufficient 
information about reliability and measurement error, test administrators can calculate the CIs 
around their obtained scores themselves. This step is important, as the present studies show 
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	that the interpretation of exact test scores obtained from single tests does not hold empirically, 
which strongly calls into question the use of cut-off scores. Yet, due to restricted reliability, 
CIs that are specific to age and performance level are quite wide for intelligence (up to 30 IQ 
points) and can be expected to be so for attention and executive functions scores as well. The 
extended width of confidence intervals challenges the allocation of a clear diagnosis. One way 
to deal with this issue may be to conduct at least two tests for the same attribute. If test scores 
obtained in two different tests are comparable, the interpretation of a test result and 
subsequent diagnoses and decisions are strengthened. Otherwise, differences in theoretical 
background, test situations, and individual characteristics that might have differentially 
interfered with the two tests would need to be considered in order to integrate diverging 
results in the diagnostic process. Yet, in the longer term, further research might reveal 
whether and how accuracy of psychometric test scores can be increased in order to also 
enhance the comparability and diagnostic utility of tests. 
One possible approach to enhancing the accuracy of intelligence test scores addresses 
the circumstance that most contemporary intelligence tests provide composite scores 
reflecting not only general intelligence but also broad abilities. General intelligence and broad 
abilities are thereby assessed with the same subtests. As stated by Luecht, Gierl, Tan, and 
Huff (2006), it is a great challenge to measure something general and something specific with 
the same instrument. This is because the variance of a set of test scores is limited. As a 
consequence, if a large amount of variance can be explained by a single aggregated score 
(e.g., general intelligence score), little variance is left to be unique to any subscore (e.g., 
factor scores, broad abilities), or vice versa. In this vein, many studies have shown that most 
factor scores in contemporary intelligence tests contain only a little unique variance compared 
to the IQ (Canivez & Youngstrom, 2019; McGill, Dombrowski, & Canivez, 2018). Instead of 
constructing tests that provide general as well as broad ability scores, Luecht et al. (2006) 
proposed creating multiple unidimensional tests, of which each should be carefully 
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	constructed to measure specific theoretically based cognitive abilities (e.g., fluid intelligence, 
crystallized intelligence, processing speed, etc.). Transferring findings from Farmer et al. 
(2019) to this approach, each specific test would need to consist of at least 4 but up to 12 
heterogeneous subtests with high specific factor loadings. As found by Beaujean and Benson 
(2019b), the lower the factor loadings, the more subtests need to be included in a composite 
score to represent the target attribute as accurately as possible. In turn, if a test is constructed 
to measure general intelligence, the composite score should consist of (only) subtests with 
high g loadings. This approach could be applicable for tests measuring attention and executive 
functions as well. This would mean that each component of the theoretical models (e.g., 
sustained or selective attention; updating, inhibition, and shifting of attention) should be 
measured with at least four subtests that highly load on the target component and that add up 
to a composite score. With such a procedure, reliability of a test score may be enhanced and 
tests will be more useful for individual diagnostic purposes.  
However, even if future research supports this approach, there are several challenges 
associated with it, of which I would like to point out three: First, the construction as well as 
the administration of such tests would be quite costly and time consuming. Second, there are 
studies indicating a structural change in the components of executive functions: These studies 
indicate that the three classic subcomponents of executive functions are relatively 
undifferentiated and best represented by a single general factor in preschool children, two 
factors can be differentiated for school-age children, and a three-factor structure is only 
evident from late childhood on (e.g., Lee, Bull, & Ho, 2013; Roebers, 2017; Wiebe et al., 
2011). Such structural change would need to be considered in tests measuring each 
component separately (ore one single general component) for individual diagnostic purposes. 
Third, theoretical models of human cognition have developed and changed in the past decades 
and will most probably continue to do so. For instance, as introduced above, recent theories 
include attentional processes and executive functions as part of a more comprehensive system 
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	of self-regulation that encompasses biological, emotional, behavioral, and cognitive control 
and regulation processes (Blair & Raver, 2012, 2015; Calkins & Williford, 2009). Other 
strands of research include attentional processes and executive functions in an extended 
version of CHC theory (Jewsbury, Bowden, & Duff, 2017) or in alternative theories of 
intelligence (e.g., Planning, Attention-Arousal, Simultaneous and Successive [PASS] theory 
of intelligence; Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994; Naglieri, Das, & Goldstein, 2012), due to their 
overlap with intelligence (e.g., working memory or processing speed). If future cognitive tests 
are constructed based on such theories, the composition of a general ability score as well as 
the more specific abilities to be assessed would be changed, with high expected impact on 
comparability and diagnostic utility of such tests in school psychology.  
Conclusion 
Findings from the present research show that standardized scores obtained in different 
psychometric tests that purport to measure the same psychological cognitive abilities are not 
necessarily comparable in a way that leads to the same diagnostic classification. Sources of 
incomparability seem to be differences in or weak theoretical grounding and measurement 
error. To account for this, the CI and not the exact test score should always be interpreted in 
tests used for diagnostic purposes. The CI should be calculated on reliability estimates that 
take measurement error adequately into account. Future research and test construction 
approaches may provide tests that are even more strongly based on prevailing theories and 
enhanced in accuracy. Approaches to enhancing the accuracy of diagnostic classification are 
associated with considerable time and financial costs; yet, given the far-reaching 
consequences diagnoses may have, it can be considered well worth the effort.  
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Abstract 
A large body of research shows that IQs obtained from different intelligence tests 
substantially correlate on the group level. Yet, there is little research investigating whether 
different intelligence tests yield comparable results for individuals. This is, however, 
paramount to the application of intelligence tests in practice, as high-stakes decisions are 
based on individual test results. We therefore investigated whether seven current and widely 
used intelligence tests yield comparable results for individuals aged 4–20 years. We found 
mostly substantial correlations, though several significant mean differences on the group 
level. Results on individual-level comparability indicate that the interpretation of exact 
intelligence test scores does not hold. Even the 95% confidence intervals could not be reliably 
replicated with different intelligence tests. Further, the nominal level of intelligence 
systematically predicted IQ differences between tests. In this vein, individual-level 
comparability was lower in the below-average and above-average intelligence ranges 
compared to the average range, even after considering the regression toward the mean. Yet 
these are the specific ranges in which diagnostic questions most often arise in practice. 
Similar patterns appeared for the individual-level comparability of nonverbal and verbal 
intelligence factor scores as well. Implications for test interpretation and test construction are 
discussed. 
Keywords 
intelligence tests, IQ, comparability, individual-level, children and adolescents  
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In the field of applied educational, learning, and school psychology, psychometric test 
batteries are often applied to assess the developmental status and abilities of a child or 
adolescent. These test results provide the basis for far-reaching decisions concerning 
educational support, interventions, and therapy (e.g., curative education, special education 
programs, support for gifted children, attention training). When making an educational 
decision, one of the most frequently assessed domains is an individual’s cognitive ability, 
measured by intelligence tests. This might be because many diagnoses that are relevant in the 
field of school psychology can only be given in relation to a standardized intelligence test, as 
recommended by the current versions of the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems (World Health Organization, 2018) and the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). In addition, intelligence is one of the most investigated constructs of psychology and 
numerous tests are available in many languages to provide age-standardized intelligence 
scores, that is, IQs (Lubinski, 2004). Furthermore, numerous studies have confirmed the 
association between intelligence and central areas of life, such as educational success (Deary, 
Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007), professional success and income (Damian, Su, Shanahan, 
Trautwein, & Roberts, 2015), success in interpersonal relationships (Aspara, Wittkowski, & 
Luo, 2018), health (Wrulich et al., 2014), and even longevity (Calvin et al., 2011). 
Group- and Individual-Level Comparability  
Currently, a large number of different intelligence tests are available to diagnosticians. 
For example, according to a keyword search, there are 39 intelligence tests available for 
purchase via Testzentrale (http://www.testzentrale.ch), an official distributor of German 
psychometric tests. As German tests are often adaptations of U.S. originals, there are probably 
even more widely used intelligence tests available in the United States. The opportunity to 
choose between different intelligence tests has several advantages. For example, learning 
effects can be minimized by selecting an alternative test battery when testing multiple times. 
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Moreover, additional test batteries can be used to confirm the results of one test. Finally, 
special characteristics of an individual or of a specific counseling situation can be taken into 
account by, for instance, providing nonnative speakers with tests that are not specific to any 
one culture (Hagmann-von Arx, Petermann, & Grob, 2013), or by using a short test 
(screening) when intelligence is assessed as a control variable (Hagmann-von Arx & Grob, 
2014). Diagnosticians are advised to exclusively apply intelligence tests with strong evidence 
for reliability and validity (International Test Commission, 2001) in terms of content, 
construct (i.e., convergent and divergent), and criterion (i.e., concurrent and predictive power) 
validity. Tests that meet these criteria are assumed to render reliable and valid results, and IQs 
obtained in different test batteries are expected to be comparable (Floyd, Clark, & Shadish, 
2008) if they are composed of multiple, diverse, and reliable subtests with high loadings on a 
general intelligence (g) factor (Jensen & Weng, 1994). This assumption is supported by the 
principle of aggregation (Rushton, Brainerd, & Pressley, 1983), which states that the sum of 
multiple measurements (IQ based on multiple subtests) represents a more stable predictor than 
a single measurement (IQ based on a single subtest) because measurement error is averaged 
out. Moreover, a large body of research has confirmed that many intelligence test batteries are 
highly correlated (Allen, Stolberg, Thaler, Sutton, & Mayfield, 2014; Baum, Shear, Howe, & 
Bishop, 2015; Hagmann-von Arx, Grob, Petermann, & Daseking, 2012; Hagmann-von Arx, 
Lemola, & Grob, 2018), which can be seen as an indication of convergent validity, that is, that 
the test batteries measure the same constructs (Neukrug & Fawcett, 2014). These results are 
based on group-level comparisons.  
Yet, the fact that different intelligence tests correlate highly on the group level is a 
necessary but not a sufficient criterion for comparability, because diagnoses are given to 
individuals and because decisions are made based on individual intelligence test results. To 
ensure that these decisions and diagnoses are valid, the tests must also be comparable on the 
individual level. This means that it should not matter which test is used to assess an 
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individual’s intelligence, as the IQ should always be equal given a certain error tolerance. 
Floyd et al. (2008) referred to this type of comparability as the exchangeability of IQs. As yet, 
there is surprisingly little research on this, with only two studies available that investigated the 
comparability of IQs on the individual level. Both studies used the overlap of the 90% 
confidence intervals (CIs) of each intelligence test pair as criterion for comparability (Floyd et 
al., 2008; Hagmann-von Arx et al., 2018). The advantage of using CIs is that it takes the 
unreliability of measurements into account. However, when using CIs, the definition of 
comparability varies across test comparisons, as reliability and CIs differ between tests. Floyd 
et al. (2008) therefore used a second criterion for comparability—an absolute difference 
between two scores less than or equal to 10 IQ points—which is in line with guidelines that 
recommend considering 5 IQ points above and below the obtained IQ when diagnosing 
mental retardation (i.e., Bergeron, Floyd, & Shands, 2008). In the first study, Floyd et al. 
(2008) compared seven English intelligence tests with standardization years between 1987 
and 2003 for an age range of 8 to 16 years, with one sample also covering undergraduate 
students. Findings showed that the IQs differed in about 36% of intelligence test pairs when 
considering the 90% CI, and in about 28% when considering the 10-point IQ criterion. In the 
second study, Hagmann-von Arx et al. (2018) compared five German intelligence tests for 6- 
to 11-year-old children and with standardization years between 2003 and 2012. The authors 
found that IQs differed in about 24% of intelligence test pairs when considering the 90% CI.  
The two studies indicate that for 64% to 76% of schoolchildren, the IQs obtained from 
different tests can be considered comparable on the individual level. This means that 
decisions and diagnoses based on a single test are of questionable validity for a fourth to a 
third of children.  
Reasons for (In-)Comparability 
To better understand this relatively high percentage of incomparability, it is important 
to consider potential sources of variability in intelligence test scores that do not stem from 
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true ability of the examinees. In addition to unsystematic random errors, these sources include 
specific test characteristics, characteristics of the test situation (environmental influences), 
personal characteristics of the examinees, and examiner’s influence (National Research 
Council, 2002). 
Test batteries that are applied for important decisions must provide reliable test results, 
that is, have reliability coefficients of at least .90 (Evers, 2001). This means that even if the 
composite score of a particular test fulfills this criterion, it always contains an unsystematic 
random error component. This is usually taken into account with the CI plotted around the 
obtained IQ. Furthermore, it is possible that test batteries lead to inconsistent test results 
because of differences in standardization. For example, the historical time of standardization 
may be an influential aspect, as demonstrated by Flynn (1987, 2009). The Flynn effect refers 
to the fact that the average intelligence of a population increases between 3 and 5 IQ points 
per decade. In contrast, since the end of the 1990s, there have also been studies showing a 
negative or so-called anti-Flynn effect. Authors of these studies postulate that average IQs 
have been declining again since the 1990s (Dutton & Lynn, 2014; Lynn & Harvey, 2008; 
Sundet, Barlaug, & Torjussen, 2004). Regardless of whether there is an increase or decrease 
in average intelligence, performance on intelligence tests appears to be influenced by culture 
and cohort effects. This issue can play an important role in the comparability of test results, 
especially if the standardization years of two tests are far apart. Moreover, IQs are not a pure 
representation of an individual’s true cognitive ability (intelligence construct or true g). 
Therefore, it is important to consider test characteristics that affect measurement accuracy and 
that vary across intelligence tests (Farmer, Floyd, Reynolds, & Berlin, 2019). For instance, 
most contemporary intelligences tests relate to the Cattel–Horn–Carroll (CHC) theory of 
cognitive abilities (McGrew, 1997, 2005, 2009). Yet, the composite score of an intelligence 
test, which is considered an indicator of g, may be calculated based on different sets of 
subtests that vary in number as well as heterogeneity of content. Especially for IQs that are 
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based on only a few subtests, inadequate content sampling poses a risk for inflation or 
deflation of IQs and may therefore reduce their comparability (Farmer et al., 2019). In 
addition, systematic differences in task format may occur (e.g., verbal or nonverbal, paper-
and-pencil or computer based Floyd et al., 2008). This may interact with conditions and 
characteristics of individual examinees such as limited language skills, for example, due to 
migration background (Daseking, Lipsius, Petermann, & Waldmann, 2008), or any type of 
speech or language disorder (Gallinat & Spaulding, 2014; Miller & Gilbert, 2008), as well as 
impaired fine motor skills (Yin Foo, Guppy, & Johnston, 2013). Regarding characteristics of a 
specific test situation, the order of test administration with practice or fatigue effects 
(Hausknecht, Halpert, Di Paolo, & Moriarty Gerrard, 2007), the time interval between two or 
more tests, or the time of day (Gupta, 1991) in combination with “morningness” and 
“eveningness” of examinees (Goldstein, Hahn, Hasher, Wiprzycka, & Zelazo, 2007) as well 
as general motivation in the specific test situation (Duckworth, Quinn, Lynam, Loeber, & 
Stouthamer-Loeber, 2011) may cause variance in intelligence test scores that does not reflect 
an examinee’s true ability. To investigate to what extent intelligence test scores are influenced 
by individuals and test procedures, Hagmann-von Arx et al. (2018) and Floyd et al. (2008) 
applied generalizability theory analyses (Briesch, Swaminathan, Welsh, & Chafouleas, 2014; 
Cronbach, Gleser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972). Both studies showed that no more than 4% of 
the variance in IQs could be attributed to specific test characteristics. The largest part of the 
variance (7%–27%, Floyd et al., 2008; 29%–42%, Hagmann-von Arx et al., 2018) was 
attributable to interactions between the examinees and the test situation. However, only 
Hagmann-von Arx et al. (2018) explored the impact of specific variables, such as time 
interval between two tests, the order of test administration, or qualitative nominal intelligence 
levels, on intelligence test differences and they could not detect any significant systematic 
effect.  
Limitations of Previous Studies 
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The two previous studies that focused on individual-level comparability of intelligence 
tests results show several limitations. First, they did not cover the whole age span in which 
questions relevant to school psychology tend to arise. Furthermore, age was not investigated 
as a possible predictor of test score differences, and although Hagmann-von Arx et al. (2018) 
discussed language skills and migration background as a possible influence on test 
comparability, they did not include any language or cultural background variable in their 
analyses. Moreover, to investigate the possible impact of intelligence level on test 
comparability, Hagmann-von Arx et al. (2018) calculated a mean IQ across all intelligence 
tests that they carried out. This practice is problematic as it obfuscates the influence of 
systematic errors on the specific test results (Schneider & McGrew, 2011). Another limitation 
is that both studies investigated the overlap of the 90% CIs, whereas in practice it is most 
often the 95% CI that is used for interpretation. Last, previous studies investigated only 
individual-level comparability for general intelligence composites scores (i.e., the full-scale 
IQ, hereafter referred to simply as IQ) but not for factor index scores, such as verbal and 
nonverbal factor indexes. Factor index scores are used to identify specific strengths and 
difficulties (cognitive profile analysis) by about 49% to 55% of school psychologists in the 
United States (Benson, Floyd, Kranzler, Eckert, & Fefer, 2018), despite growing evidence 
against their usefulness (McGill, Dombrowski, & Canivez, 2018). Therefore, it seems 
essential to shed light on the individual-level comparability for factor indexes.  
The Present Study 
The aim of our study was to gain insight into the comparability of intelligence test 
scores with a main focus on individual-level comparability, addressing the aforementioned 
research gaps and limitations from previous studies. For this purpose, we assessed seven 
current and widely used intelligence tests across childhood and adolescence in German-
speaking countries. The wide age range of participants in our sample (4–20 years) covers the 
preschool, primary, and secondary school years as well as the years after high school 
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graduation, representing the entire age range of development in which school-psychology 
issues arise. In accordance with previous research, we expected substantial correlations 
(Hypothesis 1) and comparable mean scores (Hypothesis 2) on the group level. In addition, 
we explored the comparability of IQs on an individual level (Research Question 1) using 
several criteria for comparability including criteria that consider reliability (i.e., overlap of the 
90% and 95% CIs) as well as criteria that are independent of reliability and therefore invariant 
across test batteries (i.e., maximum absolute difference of 10 IQ points and nominal 
intelligence level). We also explored whether the year of standardization (with respect to a 
possible Flynn or anti-Flynn effect) influenced comparability such that tests with earlier 
standardization years revealed higher IQs than tests with a more recent standardization or vice 
versa (Research Question 2). Moreover, we investigated the individual-level comparability for 
nonverbal (nonverbal intelligence; NI) and verbal (verbal intelligence; VI) factor indexes of 
each intelligence test and examined whether individual-level comparability was significantly 
higher or lower for NI and VI versus IQ (Research Question 3). Last, we investigated whether 
age, bilingualism, time interval between two tests, order of test administration, and nominal 
intelligence level were significantly related to IQ differences as an indicator of comparability 
(Research Question 4). We think providing precise evidence on these questions will have vast 
consequences for theory and practice in intelligence testing. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample was a subsample of the standardization and validation study of the 
Intelligence and Development Scales–2 (IDS-2; Grob & Hagmann-von Arx, 2018) as well as 
of the German adaptation of the Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scales–Fifth Edition (SB5; Grob, 
Gygi, & Hagmann-von Arx, 2019). We included 383 children and adolescents (Mage = 10.31 
years, SDage = 3.96; age range: 4 to 20 years; 47% boys). The percentage of bilingual and 
nonnative speakers was 32%. All participants spoke German well enough to understand 
APPENDIX A: Study I 42
		
	
instructions and to give oral answers. None of the participants had a speech or language 
disorder. According to parent and self-reports, 10 of the included participants were diagnosed 
with a learning disorder (e.g., dyslexia or dyscalculia), one was diagnosed with Asperger’s 
syndrome, and 15 were diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. The pattern of 
test comparability did not change with the inclusion of these participants; hence they were not 
excluded from the study. Forty-eight percent of the participants’ mothers held a university 
degree.  
Measures 
For the intelligence test comparisons, we applied the IDS-2 (Grob & Hagmann-von 
Arx, 2018), the German adaptations of the SB5 (Grob et al., 2019), the Reynolds Intellectual 
Assessment Scales (RIAS; Hagmann-von Arx & Grob, 2014), the Snijders Oomen Nonverbal 
Intelligence Test 6-40 (SON-R 6-40; Tellegen, Laros, & Petermann, 2012), the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale–Third Edition (WAIS-III; von Aster, Neubauer, & Horn, 2006), the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children–Fourth Edition (WISC-IV; Petermann & 
Petermann, 2011), and the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence–Third 
Edition (WPPSI-III; Petermann, 2009). Details on the intelligence tests such as age range, 
latent factors measured, year of standardization, and reliability (internal consistencies), as 
well as indications of which latent factors were classified as IQ, NI, and VI, can be found in 
Table 1. 
Procedure 
Recruitment was carried out for preschoolers via day-care centers, nursery schools, 
and kindergartens and for school-aged children and adolescents via schools, institutions, and 
private contacts. All participants were assessed with the IDS-2 and/or the SB5 and with one or 
more of the above-mentioned intelligence tests that were suitable for their age (as described in 
Table 1). Due to restrictions in testing time, some participants could not be assessed with all 
measures that were suitable for their age. The assessments were conducted between June 2015 
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and February 2018 in individual settings by trained psychology major students. The tests took 
place at participants’ homes or at the University of Basel. The participants (16- to 20-year-
olds) or their parents (4- to 15-year-olds) received written feedback on the test results, where 
standard scores were available (i.e., RIAS, SON-R 6-40, WAIS-III, WISC-IV, WPPSI-III). 
For the standardization study, participants received a voucher worth CHF 30 (for a 3 to 3.5-h 
test; i.e., IDS-2) or CHF 20 (for a 2-h test; i.e., SB5) instead of written feedback, as standard 
scores were not available for these tests at that time. The Ethics Committee of Northwest and 
Central Switzerland approved the study protocol. Parents gave written informed consent for 
their child to participate and participants gave oral (children) or written (adolescents) 
informed assent. 
Statistical Analyses 
In a preliminary step, the raw test scores of the intelligence tests were transformed into 
the respective IQs (M = 100, SD = 15) using the test manuals. The assumption of normal 
distribution was tested using the Shapiro–Wilk test. The IQs of the IDS-2, SB5, RIAS, SON-
R 6-40, WAIS-III, and WPPSI-I were normally distributed (W = .959–.994, p > .05). The 
distribution of the WISC-IV scores deviated significantly from a normal distribution (W = 
.967, p < .001), and therefore nonparametric methods were used for the intelligence test 
comparisons involving the WISC-IV. We tested whether the mean IQs in our sample differed 
from the expected mean of 100 using single-sample t tests and a single-sample Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test for the WISC-IV. The analyses described in the following refer to the 
comparison of all intelligence test pairs, except the Wechsler scales (i.e., WAIS-III, WISC-
IV, and WPPSI-II). They were not compared among each other, since these each apply to 
different age ranges. Pearson’s product-moment correlations and Spearman’s rank-order 
correlations were calculated for all intelligence test pairs and were further corrected for 
unreliability (Hypothesis 1).  
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To test for group-level comparability of the intelligence test scores, t tests for 
dependent samples or Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were calculated (Hypothesis 2). As effect 
sizes, Cohen’s d was calculated for t tests and r for Wilcoxon sign-rank tests. Group-level 
differences were interpreted as substantial if statistical significance was given at p < .05 and 
an effect of d ≥ 0.20 or r ≥ .10 was reached.  
To test for the comparability of IQs at the individual level (Research Question 1), we 
applied five different criteria to define comparability. First, we calculated the sum of half of 
the 90% CIs of two tests as the critical value, following Floyd et al. (2008). Two IQs of the 
same individual were considered comparable if the difference between the IQs was smaller 
than this value (Criterion CI90), which means that the 90% CIs of the two test scores 
overlapped. Since in practice it is often the 95% CI and not the 90% CI that is interpreted, the 
overlap of the 95% CIs of two test scores of an individual were also investigated as a second 
indicator of comparability (Criterion CI95).  
To be able to compare our results to findings from previous studies (Floyd et al., 2008; 
Hagmann-von Arx et al., 2018), we plotted the 90% CIs around the obtained test scores using 
the standard error of the mean. However, following recommendations of Atkinson (1989) and 
to correct for the regression toward the mean, most intelligence tests use the estimated true 
score instead of the obtained test score as well as the standard error of estimation to plot the 
CI, as is the case for the seven intelligence tests we investigated in this study. Therefore, we 
adhered to this procedure for the calculation of 95% CIs. As a third criterion, following Floyd 
et al. (2008), we assumed comparability if the absolute difference between two IQs of an 
individual was less than or equal to 10 points (Criterion IQ10). Finally, the correspondence of 
the nominal intelligence level (according to Grob, Reiman, Gut, & Frischknecht, 2013: lower 
extreme IQ: < 70; below average IQ: 70–84; average IQ: 85–115; above average IQ: 116–
130; upper extreme IQ: 130; Criterion Nominal IQ) as well as the correspondence of the 
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nominal intelligence levels for the 95% CIs (e.g., average to above average; Criterion 
Nominal CI95) was calculated.  
To investigate if there was an effect of standardization time (with respect to a possible 
Flynn or anti-Flynn effect), we calculated the percentage of participants who scored higher on 
the more recently standardized intelligence test and the percentage of participants who scored 
lower on the more recently standardized intelligence test at Criterion CI90 for each pair of 
intelligence tests (Research Question 2). To examine the individual-level comparability of NI 
and VI (Research Question 3), we used the CI95 as a criterion that considers test reliability as 
well as the IQ10 as a criterion that is independent of test reliability and therefore invariant 
across all test batteries. We then conducted χ2 tests to examine whether individual-level 
comparability was significantly higher or lower in NI and VI versus IQ. Finally, to analyze 
whether age, bilingualism, time interval between two tests, order of test administration, and 
nominal intelligence level significantly predicted the comparability of test results, we ran 
simple linear regressions with the described variables as independent variables and absolute 
IQ differences between each test pair as separate dependent variables (Research Question 4). 
Age and time interval between two tests were included as continuous variables and 
bilingualism and order of test administration as binary variables. In contrast to the Criterion 
Nominal IQ (as described above), nominal intelligence level was defined here as a three-level 
categorical variable (i.e., below average IQ: < 85; average IQ: 85–115; above average IQ: > 
115) due to small sample sizes at the tails. For each test comparison, a participant was 
classified as below average or above average if at least one of the two intelligence test scores 
fell within the defined range.  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the intelligence test scores collected in our study. 
Single-sample t tests revealed that means of all IQs (M = 102.46–115.29, p = .007 to p < .001) 
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were significantly higher than the expected mean (M = 100). Further, the standard deviations 
of all intelligence tests (SD = 9.64–12.80) except for the SON-R 6-40 (SD = 15.17) were 
smaller compared to the expected standard deviation (SD = 15).  
Group-Level Comparisons 
Table 3 shows the results of all 18 intelligence test comparisons on the group level. 
The first of each pair of intelligence tests is the one with the more recent standardization year, 
except for the IDS-2 and the SB5, which were standardized within the same time period. Due 
to the restricted standard deviations reported above, Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
coefficients and Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficients were corrected not only for 
attenuation but also for range restriction, according to the formula proposed by Alexander, 
Carson, Alliger, and Carr (1987, p. 312). Sixteen of 18 correlations were significant and 
ranged from moderate to strong. Only the correlations between the SB5 and the WAIS-III (r = 
.38, p = .25) and between the SON-R 6-40 and the WAIS-III (r = .37,	p = .08) were rather 
weak and did not reach statistical significance. Further, t tests for dependent samples and 
Wilcoxon tests showed that the means at the group level were substantially lower for the first-
listed test with more recent standardization years in 13 of the 18 comparisons (Mdiff = 2.81 to -
13.43, d = -0.27 to -1.29, r = -.23 to -.81). Only regarding the comparisons between the SON-
R 6-40 and the WPPSI-III (Mdiff = 9.28, d = 0.73) was the mean score higher for the SON-R 
6-40 with more recent standardization years. The comparisons between the IDS-2 and the 
SB5, between the SB5 and the RIAS, between the SB5 and the WAIS-III, and between the 
RIAS and the WPPSI-III did not reveal substantial differences. 
Individual-Level Comparisons 
Table 4 shows the results of the intelligence test comparisons on the individual level 
(Research Question 1). A total of 1,774 test comparisons were analyzed across all seven 
intelligence tests and 383 subjects. Since the number of possible comparisons between the 
different test pairs varied considerably, the total percentage of comparability was calculated 
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across all 1,774 test comparisons.	The total comparability regarding the Criteria CI90, IQ10, 
CI95, Nominal IQ, and Nominal CI95 was 49.8%, 58.1%, 61.9%, 61.9%, and 89.4%, 
respectively. Regarding Research Question 2, in 39.9% of all cases a lower IQ was achieved 
in the more recent (first-mentioned) test and in only 9.6% of all cases was a higher IQ 
achieved in the more recent test. The comparison between the IDS-2 and the SB5 was 
excluded from this analysis as these tests were standardized within the same time period. 
Detailed results on the individual-level comparability of NI and VI (Research 
Question 3) are reported in Supplemental Tables 1 and 2. For NI, a total of 1,780 test 
comparisons were analyzed across all seven test batteries, including the IQ of the SON-R 6-
40, as it is officially classified as NI. For VI, a total of 1,020 test comparisons were analyzed 
across all tests except the SON-R 6-40, as this test does not provide any verbal index score. 
Regarding Criterion IQ10, χ2 tests revealed that with 49.3%, the total comparability of NI was 
significantly lower than the total comparability of IQ, with 58.1% (χ2 = 27.62, p < .001) and 
the total comparability of VI with 62.2% was significantly higher than the total comparability 
of IQ (χ2 = 6.02, p < .05). When considering Criterion CI95, the total comparability of NI 
increased to 62.2% and did not differ significantly from the total comparability of IQ, with 
61.9% (χ2 = 0.03, p > .05). The total comparability of VI also increased to 68.6% and was 
significantly higher than the total comparability of IQ (χ2 = 12.60, p < .001). 
Predictors of Incomparability 
Results of linear regressions with age, bilingualism, time interval between two tests, 
order of test administration, and nominal intelligence level as predictors of IQ differences 
(Research Question 4) are reported in Table 5. Age was a significant positive predictor 
(higher IQ differences for older participants) for only 1 of 18 IQ differences, and a significant 
negative predictor (lower IQ differences for older participants) for 3 of 18 test comparisons. 
Bilingualism was a significant positive predictor (higher IQ differences for bilingual 
compared to monolingual participants) for three test comparisons. Time interval between tests 
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was a positive predictor (higher IQ differences with larger time interval between two tests) in 
one test comparison. Order of test administration was a significant positive predictor for two 
test comparisons.  
Regarding nominal intelligence level, having an IQ in the below-average range in at 
least one intelligence test was significantly associated with higher IQ differences in six test 
comparisons. Two of the 18 analyses (SB5 vs. WAIS-III; SON-R 6-40 vs. WPPSI-III) could 
not be completed as none of the participants who completed either of the test combinations 
achieved an IQ in the below-average range. Having an IQ in the above-average range in at 
least one intelligence test was significantly associated with higher IQ differences in 15 test 
comparisons (β = .18 to .70 and all p ≤ .018) and significantly associated with lower IQ 
differences in one test comparison. 
Post Hoc Analyses 
The systematic effect of the nominal intelligence level on IQ differences revealed in 
the regression analyses, together with the fact that the mean IQs in our sample were 
significantly higher than the standardization sample means in all intelligence tests, may have 
reduced the overall comparability. It therefore may have limited the generalizability of our 
findings. To address this issue, we additionally ran post hoc analyses on the individual-level 
comparability for the three nominal intelligence levels (below average: IQ < 85; average IQ: 
85–115; above average IQ: > 115) separately. In the below-average IQ group, a total of 144 
intelligence test comparisons could be analyzed. In the average IQ group, the total of possible 
comparisons amounted to 608, and in the above-average IQ group, it was 972. The total 
percentages of comparability of the three groups are shown in Table 4. Regarding the 
Criterion CI90, the comparability increased to 61.4% in the average group and decreased to 
44.4% each in the above- and below-average groups, compared to the overall comparability. 
Regarding Criterion IQ10, the comparability increased to 71.2% in the average group and 
decreased to 50.7% in the below-average and to 51.5% in the above-average group. 
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Regarding the Criterion CI95, the comparability increased to 75.6% in the average group and 
decreased to 56.3% in the below-average and to 55.9% in the above-average group. 
Regarding the Criterion Nominal IQ, the comparability decreased to 44.4% in the below-
average and to 46.1% in the above-average group. Regarding the Criterion Nominal CI95, the 
comparability decreased to 85.4% in the below-average and to 84.5% in the above-average 
group. For the latter two criteria, the comparability in the average group was 100% as it was 
artificially defined by group allocation. 
Discussion 
The main objective of the present study was to investigate comparability between IQs 
from seven widely used intelligence tests on the group level and in particular on the individual 
level. In line with Hypothesis 1, we found mainly substantial correlations between 
intelligence tests on the group level. Only 2 of 18 correlations were not significant, and these 
should be interpreted with caution, as sample sizes in these two cases were occasionally low. 
However, contrary to our Hypothesis 2 and to Hagmann-von Arx et al. (2018), we found that 
in 14 of 18 comparisons, the mean IQ differed significantly between two test scores. 
Investigating whether IQs obtained from different tests could be classified as comparable 
(exchangeable) on an individual level, we found that this was true for a low percentage that 
varied across the different criteria from 49.8% (criterion CI90) to 89.9% (criterion Nominal 
CI95). Within the percentage of incomparability, tests with earlier standardization years 
yielded higher IQs than tests with more recent standardization years, which we interpret as an 
indicator of the Flynn effect (Research Question 2). Beyond that, the nominal intelligence 
level (below- or above-average vs. average range) was the only systematic predictor of 
intelligence score differences between tests (Research Question 4). Therefore, we ran post hoc 
analyses on individual-level comparisons for the three nominal intelligence levels separately. 
With these analyses we not only were able to solve the issue regarding the bias toward a 
higher IQ in our study sample but also found that comparability was considerably lower in the 
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below- and above-average range (lowest comparability with 44.4% for criterion CI90) 
compared to the average range (lowest comparability with 61.4% for criterion CI90). This 
result is alarming and calls for explanation, as predominantly in these ranges diagnosis is 
particularly relevant for eligibility and high-stakes decisions. A similar pattern was found for 
the individual-level comparability of nonverbal and verbal factor scores as well (Research 
Question 3). 
Individual-Level Comparisons 
Before taking a closer look at the various criteria of comparability on the individual 
level, we would like to point out that we neither interpret nor compare comparability of 
specific test combinations (e.g., whether the comparability between the IDS-2 and the RIAS is 
higher than the comparability between the IDS-2 and the WISC-IV) because sample sizes 
varied considerably between test comparisons. Instead, we focus on the overall comparability 
in order to compare and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the different criteria.  
Our results show that comparability was lowest for the criterion CI90, as this interval 
was narrowest. With a between-test comparability of slightly more than 60% in the average 
and less than 50% in the below- and above-average IQ range, using the 90% CI for test 
interpretation does not seem to be useful. With the criterion proposed by Bergeron et al. 
(2008) to consider 5 IQ points above and below the exact point score when diagnosing 
intellectual ability (criterion IQ10), test comparability was higher in the average range with 
over 70% but still quite low in the below- and above-average range with about 50%. CI95 and 
nominal IQ have revealed the same percentage of comparability for the total sample with 
slightly over 60%. However, the CI95 led to better comparability in the below- and above-
average range (around 55%) compared to the Nominal IQ (under 50%). Therefore, although 
the nominal IQ has practical relevance, as it allows for clear classification and may thus be 
used for diagnosis and classification (e.g., of intellectual disability or intellectual giftedness), 
comparability on this criterion is too low to be of diagnostic utility. The CI95 should hence be 
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preferred to the Nominal IQ. Last, the comparability between tests is maximized and 
approaches 90% when interpreted on the Nominal CI95 criterion. However, one must bear in 
mind that the IQ scores of two tests could differ by up to 45 points and still be classified as 
“comparable” according to this criterion. Given such a wide IQ range, hardly any useful 
decisions or conclusions can be made. For this reason, and even though this criterion may best 
represent the extent to which intelligence tests are incomparable, the Nominal CI95 does not 
provide a diagnostically useful interpretation of test results. Consequently, it seems very 
difficult to find a criterion that allows for both a reasonably narrow IQ range and a high 
probability that a comparable result would be achieved with another intelligence test. Overall, 
we conclude that for the IQ, the CI95 criterion has the best trade-off between comparability 
and accuracy. Still, the percentage of comparability, especially in the below- and above-
average range, is disconcertingly low on this criterion too.  
For the investigation of individual-level comparability of first-order factor scores, our 
results show that the comparability of NIs is lower compared to the comparability of IQs 
when reliability is not considered (criterion IQ10) and that the comparability of NIs does not 
differ from the comparability of IQs when reliability is considered (criterion CI95). However, 
the comparability of VIs was—although still quite low—significantly higher than that of IQs 
on both criteria, IQ10 and CI95. A possible explanation for the higher comparability of VIs 
could be that there is greater content overlap between the subtests of the different test batteries 
that constitute the VI compared to the NI and IQ. Although, content overlap should be 
neglectable for the measurement of g due to the principle of aggregation (Rushton et al., 
1983), it does play an important role when the number of subtests is lower (Farmer et al., 
2019), as it is in VI and NI. This could now lead to the conclusion that the VI is to be 
preferred to the IQ as an intelligence estimate. However, there is a large body of research with 
at least two widely supported counterarguments: First, IQ is a more accurate representation of 
g and first-order factor scores are usually less reliable than the IQ (Jensen, 1981, 1998). In this 
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sense, the finding that comparability is higher for VI than for IQ does not make VI a better 
representation of g. Second, factor scores contain only a little unique variance compared to 
the IQ (Canivez & Youngstrom, 2019; McGill et al., 2018). Consequently, we do not know to 
what extent this comparability is caused by shared variance of g and to what extent it is 
caused by more specific verbal reasoning. Therefore, we recommend interpreting NI as well 
as VI only with extreme caution, if at all, although it is a common practice among school 
psychologists. Individual-level comparability is only slightly higher for VI compared to IQ. 
With that, the discussed drawbacks of interpreting first-order factors cannot be overcome. 
Moreover, the percentage of comparability is especially low in the below- and above-
average range, not only for IQ, but also for NI and VI. At first glance it might seem plausible 
that the regression toward the mean explains this finding. However, this explanation does not 
withstand scrutiny, as the 95% CI was corrected for the regression toward the mean and 
comparability was still quite low. This not only calls for explanation but also shows the need 
to discuss what practitioners as well as test developers can do to deal with potential sources of 
incomparability. 	
Implications for the Application and Construction of Intelligence Tests 
One way to deal with this comparability issue is to apply more than one intelligence 
test, especially for high-stakes decisions. In line with this, previous results from 
generalizability theory analyses showed that up to five intelligence tests need to be applied to 
achieve a reliability of at least .90 (Hagmann-von Arx et al., 2018). As this is obviously not 
feasible in practice, the authors suggested using at least two tests for high-stakes decisions. 
Yet, whereas the interpretation of a test result and subsequent diagnoses and decisions are 
strengthened if IQs obtained in two different tests are comparable, the question of what to do 
if they lie far apart remains unanswered. Whereas it seems to be common practice to average 
composite scores from different tests to gain a more reliable and valid estimation of true 
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intelligence, we do not support this recommendation as it may cause additional measurement 
error (Schneider & McGrew, 2011). Moreover, there are numerous reasons for possible 
underachievement (e.g., fatigue, sleep quality, motivational factors, test anxiety, 
environmental distractions, etc.) but rather few reasons for possible overachievement (e.g., 
guessing, learning effects, inappropriate help from the examiner) on intelligence tests. 
Measurement error can therefore not be averaged arithmetically. Instead of averaging IQs 
across tests if the scores diverge widely, we recommend considering anamnestic information 
such as language and cultural background and personal characteristic (e.g., interaction 
difficulties) as well as environmental conditions to determine if a child’s and adolescent’s 
abilities are accurately measured (American Psychological Association, 2017; International 
Test Commission, 2001; National Research Council, 2002). This might be a necessary step 
both prior to test administration for an adaptive test selection as well as after test 
administration for a careful test interpretation. Investigating some of these possible influences 
(i.e., bilingualism, age, and test interval) on test comparability, we could not detect any 
systematic effect. However, it is possible that additional factors that have not been examined 
in this study may have impacted test comparability on the individual level. Further, it is also 
possible that some potential factors influenced test comparability for certain individuals under 
certain circumstances, but not for others. If this was the case, we must assume that 
incomparability and measurement inaccuracy is increased by random variations (e.g., a 
temporary state of an individual or random circumstances) instead of systematic effects. This 
type of error variance is often called transient error (Schmidt, Le, & Ilies, 2003). The National 
Research Council (2002) provided a comprehensive list of possible systematic and transient 
error sources (threats) including characteristics of the examinee, examiner’s influence, and 
environmental influences as well as psychometric test characteristics and stated that “all of 
them can be controlled to some considerable degree” (p. 100). Nevertheless, we note that this 
is a considerable challenge for practitioners, not only because of the multitude of potential 
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threats but also because of time pressure, that often plays a crucial role in the diagnostic 
process. Our results show the extent of incomparability across test scores when potential 
transient error sources are not considered. With this in mind, our results indicate how prone 
intelligence test scores are to interference, and how high the risk of misdiagnosis may be if the 
diagnostic process is not carried out with the utmost thoroughness. It thus seems important to 
explore what not only test administrators but also test developers can do to reduce potential 
sources of incomparability.  
In this context, we consider it important to discuss the use of internal consistency 
coefficients for the calculation of CIs. This practice should be reconsidered for mainly two 
reasons: First, the specific internal consistency coefficient used for the calculation of CIs 
differs among tests (i.e., Cronbach’s α or split-half reliability), which influences the width of 
the CI and with that also the comparability between tests. Second, internal consistency 
coefficients do not take into account the previously described transient errors. Yet, ignoring 
such transient errors leads to an overestimation of the reliability (Schmidt et al., 2003). Thus, 
it is important to investigate whether other reliability coefficients — such as the test–retest 
reliability that does consider transient errors — would provide an alternative and more 
accurate estimate and basis for the calculation of CIs. Nevertheless, this does not solve the 
problem of comparability seeming to be especially low in the below- and above-average 
intelligence levels, although CIs are already corrected for the regression toward the mean. If 
this finding is replicated in future research, it will be of interest to explore how and to what 
extent the IQ level should be considered within the calculation of reliability coefficients. 
Generally, it is essential to ensure that comparability of intelligence test results is not 
reduced by sampling error, and that test developers proceed according to the current state of 
research. This includes making sure that the IQ is based on an adequate number of subtests 
(see Farmer et al., 2019), that the IQ consists of a heterogeneous set of subtests in order to 
average out measurement error, and that only subtests with a high g loading are included 
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(Farmer et al., 2019; Jensen & Weng, 1994). Further research is needed to investigate whether 
and how individual-level comparability might be enhanced with an optimal balance of these 
three aspects. 
Limitations 
Our study has several limitations. First, mean IQs of our sample were higher than the 
standardization means. This bias may have been caused by participants being allowed to 
decide whether they wanted to do more tests after having taken either the IDS-2 or the SB5. It 
is probable that participants with lower results on one of the first tests had less joy and were 
therefore less motivated to participate in further tests. However, and fortunately, this bias 
toward higher IQs could be addressed by splitting the sample into three nominal intelligence-
level groups for individual-level analyses. Second, our sample sizes varied considerably 
between test comparisons. We therefore did not explicitly compare or interpret comparability 
of specific test combinations. Third, we had relatively small sample sizes of the youngest (4–6 
years) and oldest (16–20 years) participants. This leads to a reduced variability and might 
therefore have impacted our regression analyses with age as a possible predictor of IQ 
differences between tests. Further research including more individuals in all age ranges might 
shed further light on the possible impact of age on test comparability. Finally, information 
about mono- or bilingualism was collected via self- or parent report. An examination of actual 
language skills by using performance-based tests could provide valuable information on 
whether and to what extent they influence test comparability.  
Conclusion 
We conclude that the interpretation of an exact IQ from a single intelligence test does 
not hold empirically, which strongly questions the use of cut-off values for diagnosis and 
related educational resource allocation. At least the 95% CI must be considered when making 
high-stakes decisions. Even then, and especially in the upper and lower bounds of the IQ 
scores, there is a considerable risk that diagnosis and resource allocation for special education 
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will be based largely on test-specific characteristics and measurement error and less on the 
individual’s true ability. To reduce this risk and to enhance between-test comparability, 
diagnosticians are encouraged to consider possible factors that interfere with an individual’s 
ability. Hence, test administrators need to be well trained and informed about the limitations 
of conventional intelligence tests. Further, our results point to the fact that current intelligence 
tests may have relied too much on results derived from group-level analyses while excluding 
individual-level analyses to determine psychometric test quality. Future research is needed to 
generate effective approaches to enhancing accuracy and with this also individual-level 
comparability between tests. 
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 c
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 c
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r c
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t c
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r c
om
pa
ris
on
s w
er
e 
an
al
yz
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
de
pe
nd
en
t t
 te
st
 (t
). 
c  E
ff
ec
t s
iz
es
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
W
IS
C
-I
V
 w
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 d
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 .0
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 C
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Abstract
Research on comparability of general intelligence composites (IQs) is scarce and has
focused exclusively on comparing IQs from different test batteries, revealing limited
individual-level comparability. We add to these findings, having, for the first time,
investigated the group- and individual-level comparability of different IQs from the
same test battery. Thereby, transient error was held to a minimum and between-battery
variance was ruled out completely. We (a) determined the magnitude of intraindividual
IQ differences, (b) investigated their impact on external validity (i.e., relationships with
school grades), (c) explored possible predictors for these differences, and (d) examined
possible solutions to incomparability in the form of confidence intervals (CIs) based on
different reliability coefficients. Results are based on the standardization samples of
three intelligence test batteries, spanning from early childhood to late adulthood.
Despite high group-level comparability, individual-level comparability was often
unsatisfactory, especially towards the tails of the IQ distribution. This limited
comparability has consequences for external validity, as IQs were differentially related to
and often less predictive for school grades for individuals with high intraindividual IQ
differences. Of several predictors, only IQ level and age were systematically related to
comparability, suggesting these attributes should be considered in the calculation of
CIs. Consequently, findings challenge the use of an overall internal consistency for CIs
and suggest using CIs based on test–retest reliability or age- and IQ-specific internal
consistencies for clinical interpretation. Implications for the construction and
application of intelligence tests are discussed.
Keywords: general intelligence, IQ, screening, individual level, reliability, validity
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Limited Individual-Level Comparability of IQs Within Three Test Batteries: Impact on
External Validity, Some Explanations, and Possible Solutions
General intelligence is defined as the broad mental capacity to reason, solve
problems, comprehend complex ideas, and learn quickly (Gottfredson, 1997). It predicts
numerous important life outcomes, including academic achievement (Lubinski, 2004;
Roth et al., 2015), occupational success, socioeconomic status, income (Batty, Gale,
Tynelius, Deary, & Rasmussen, 2009; Gottfredson, 2004; Lubinski, 2004), health, and
longevity (Batty et al., 2009; Gottfredson & Deary, 2004).
The concept of general intelligence was first introduced by Charles Spearman as a
common factor explaining the positive manifold of cognitive test
outcomes—psychometric g (Spearman, 1904). Since Spearman, research on intelligence
structure has moved to hierarchical models, but the majority of these models still
includes a superordinate g factor. The currently perhaps most influential intelligence
model, the Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) model (Alfonso, Flanagan, & Radwan, 2005;
McGrew, 1997, 2009), assumes a three-stratum structure with narrow abilities (or
subtests) at the bottom that are indicators of broad abilities (or group factors, such as
fluid reasoning, comprehension knowledge, perceptual speed), which are in turn
influenced by g. Although the existence of a g factor is open to debate in the CHC
taxonomy (e.g., McGrew, 2009), virtually all intelligence tests whose development was
based on the CHC model—and almost all intelligence tests in general—include a
Full-Scale IQ (FSIQ) as an indicator of general intelligence. To avoid an intertwining of
the theoretical construct of general intelligence and its measurement, we refer to the
theoretical construct as general intelligence, to the latent measure of general intelligence
as g or the g factor, and to a (unit-weighted) subtest composite intended to measure
general intelligence as IQ.
As most intelligence tests include a general intelligence measure, a major question
in test construction concerns the determinants of a reliable and valid measurement of
general intelligence. A recent study by Farmer, Floyd, Berlin, and Reynolds (2019)
investigated such determinants by comparing the reliability and accuracy of different
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intelligence composites from two test batteries. A composite’s accuracy was defined as
the magnitude of its loading on the g factor of the other test battery. Farmer et al.
systematically varied the heterogeneity, g loadings (both separately and in
combination), and number of subtests and found that, as a single criterion, high g
loadings were more important than heterogeneity for an accurate composite. The most
accurate composites were those derived from numerous (12 to 13) highly g-loaded and
diverse subtests. However, their results also suggest a diminishing marginal utility
concerning the number of subtests, as the gains in reliability and accuracy begin to
flatten out from about four subtests on. Yet, as the authors pointed out, small gains in
reliability are of practical relevance, as they can have substantial effects on confidence
intervals (CIs) and hence on comparability on an individual level (i.e., overlap of CIs).
It is therefore important to investigate individual-level in addition to group-level
comparability to gain further insights into the accuracy of different composites.
Such individual-level comparisons have been performed between IQs derived from
different test batteries (Bünger, Grieder, Schweizer, & Grob, 2019; Floyd, Clark, &
Shadish, 2008; Hagmann-von Arx, Lemola, & Grob, 2018). These revealed substantial
intraindividual absolute differences in IQs—henceforth called IQ differences—and
limited comparability of CIs and IQs in nominal categories. All three of the
aforementioned studies concluded that any two intelligence tests do not necessarily
render comparable FSIQs on the individual level, even if they show high correlations
and no mean differences on the group level.
We add to these previous findings with the present study, in which we investigated
the individual-level comparability of different IQs derived from the same test battery
that are all intended to measure general intelligence. Proceeding this way, transient
error (i.e., errors due to variations in mood, information-processing efficiency, etc. over
time; see Schmidt, Le, & Ilies, 2003) is kept to a minimum, and between-battery
variance (i.e., differences in global test characteristic, such as general instructions, type
of presentation, general appearance of test material) is held constant. For this purpose,
the comparison between the FSIQ and a Screening IQ (ScrIQ) from the same test
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battery is well suited. While the FSIQ is typically based on a larger number of subtests
or all subtests from a test battery, a ScrIQ is based on a subset of subtests and is
intended as a rough estimate of an individual’s intellectual potential if time constraints
are high.
After practitioners have administered a screening, their decision as to whether the
rest of the test battery will also be administered is often based on the screening results
(Thompson, LoBello, Atkinson, Chisholm, & Ryan, 2004). It is therefore especially
important to investigate the individual-level comparability of the FSIQ and the ScrIQ.
To this end, we first determined the magnitude of intraindividual differences in IQs;
second, we investigated the impact of these differences by comparing the IQs’ external
validity; third, we examined possible explanations for these differences; and fourth, we
sought possible solutions to the issue of incomparability.
Given an imperfect reliability and results from Floyd et al. (2008), Hagmann-von
Arx et al. (2018), and Bünger et al. (2019), we expected to find at least some IQ
differences. To examine the possible impact of such differences on external validity, we
further determined the IQs’ differential relationships with school grades. As IQ is a
strong predictor of scholastic achievement and academic success (Deary, Strand, Smith,
& Fernandes, 2007; Gygi, Hagmann-von Arx, Schweizer, & Grob, 2017; Roth et al.,
2015; Watkins, Lei, & Canivez, 2007), these criteria are typically used for external
validation of intelligence tests. In our study, we focused not on the absolute magnitude
of relationships between IQ and school grades but rather on possible differences in
magnitude of relationships between the FSIQ and school grades and the ScrIQ and
school grades. While the former has been studied extensively (see above), to our
knowledge, effect sizes of the FSIQ and the ScrIQ have never been compared explicitly,
which is what we did in the present study.
After having determined the magnitude and impact of IQ differences, we were
interested in possible explanations for these. To achieve this, we explored several
possible predictors of IQ differences. These include variables already considered in
Hagmann-von Arx et al. (2018) and/or in Bünger et al. (2019), such as IQ level (i.e.,
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below average, average, above average) and age, as well as other, not yet examined
characteristics of the testee and his or her behavior in the test situation. Characteristics
of the composite, such as the number, g loadings, and content of subtests involved,
might also predict IQ differences, as these characteristics have an influence on the
accuracy of composites (see Farmer et al., 2019). Because these characteristics are
invariant between individuals, inclusion in quantitative analyses is not possible. Hence,
we address them in a descriptive manner only.
As a last step, we explored possible solutions to incomparability. To this end, we
examined alternative ways of describing an intelligence test result other than specific IQ
scores, aiming to achieve a more reliable and stable estimate. Obvious candidates that
were also examined in previous studies (Bünger et al., 2019; Floyd et al., 2008;
Hagmann-von Arx et al., 2018) are CIs and nominal categories (e.g., “average” for an
IQ between 85 and 115). In all three studies mentioned above, however, CIs were
computed solely on the basis of an overall internal consistency, as this reflects the most
common use in practice. Results from these studies suggest that using such CIs still
does not necessarily lead to satisfactory comparability. As an extension to these
previous studies, we therefore varied the reliability coefficients used for the calculation
of CIs. As it is known that stability (test–retest reliability) tends to be lower for
younger ages (Watkins & Smith, 2013) and toward the tails of the IQ distribution (due
to regression to the mean; Campbell & Kenny, 1999), we argue that it is necessary to
investigate whether this is also true for internal consistency. If this is the case, using
CIs based on separate internal consistency coefficients for age and IQ
groups—henceforth called age- and IQ-specific internal consistencies—should lead to
higher rates of comparability between IQs compared to using CIs based on the same
overall internal consistency for all participants. This assumption is supported by results
from Bünger et al. (2019), who found that IQ differences were considerably larger and
the percentages of participants with overlapping 95% CIs considerably lower for
below-average and above-average IQs compared to average IQs, respectively. A possible
influence of age on comparability was not investigated by Floyd et al. (2008) and
APPENDIX B: Study II 78
Hagmann-von Arx et al. (2018), and as age was not a significant predictor for IQ
differences in regression analyses reported in Bünger et al. (2019), no age-differentiated
analyses were conducted there either. However, as Bünger et al. (2019) concluded,
further analyses with larger age groups are warranted to learn more about IQ
comparability across age, which was possible in the present study.
Hence, we investigated comparability across IQ and age for all criteria, and we
examined comparability for CIs based on age- and IQ-specific internal consistencies.
Moreover, apart from the oversimplification of using a single reliability coefficient for all
individuals, using internal consistency as a reliability estimate bears the danger of
overestimating reliability, as it misses important an source of measurement
error—namely, transient error (see above; Schmidt et al., 2003). This source of error is,
however, assessed in test–retest reliability, which is why we also considered CIs based on
test–retest reliability coefficients in our study.
Present Study
The primary objective of this study was to investigate the individual-level
comparability of different IQs derived from the same test battery. For this purpose, we
compared IQs (mostly FSIQ vs. ScrIQ) for participants from the standardization
samples of three individually administered test batteries, spanning from early childhood
to late adulthood: The Intelligence and Development Scales–2 (IDS-2; Grob &
Hagmann-von Arx, 2018b), the German adaptation of the Stanford–Binet Intelligence
Scales–Fifth Edition (SB5; Grob, Gygi, & Hagmann-von Arx, 2019a), and the German
adaptation of the Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales (RIAS; Hagmann-von Arx &
Grob, 2014a). Since comparisons of IQs from different intelligence tests were not an aim
of this study, we exclusively compared IQs within these test batteries. To learn more
about the impact of, possible explanations for, and possible solutions to
incomparability, secondary objectives of this study were to examine the differential
external validity of IQs, to identify predictors for IQ differences, and to investigate how
individual-level comparability can be enhanced by varying reliability coefficients used
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for the calculation of 95% CIs.
We addressed the following hypotheses and research questions: First, concerning
group-level comparisons, we expected (a) that the IQs for each test battery would be
highly intercorrelated, and (b) that there would be no significant mean differences
between IQs. Second, concerning intraindividual differences, we examined the
magnitude of intraindividual differences in IQ points (both overall and across IQ and
age). Third, concerning differential external validity, we hypothesized that relationships
of school grades with the ScrIQ would be smaller compared to those with the FSIQ.
Fourth, concerning possible explanations for IQ differences, we examined whether
certain characteristics of the testee (e.g., age) or the testee’s behavior in the test
situation (e.g., understanding of instructions) were associated with IQ differences.
Finally, concerning possible solutions to incomparability, we examined how many
participants would achieve comparable intelligence estimates (again both overall and
across IQ and age) determined with different criteria (i.e., different 95% CIs and
nominal categories). We expected higher comparability for CIs based on age- and
IQ-specific internal consistencies and test–retest reliabilities compared to CIs based on
one overall internal consistency coefficient.
Method
Participants
The IDS-2 standardization sample consists of 1,672 participants from Switzerland,
Germany, and Austria. Complete data on all IQs were available for 1,622 participants
(50.9% female; age in years: M = 12.06, SD = 4.40, range: 5.02–20.97). About one
third (31.4%) of participants’ mothers had a university degree, 16.5% of participants
were bilingual (German and at least one other native language), 7.6% were nonnative
speakers (German not their native language), and 3.4% reported having an
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or attention-deficit disorder (ADD)
diagnosis (hereafter called AD[H]D). For a subsample of 414 individuals (50.7% female;
age in years: M = 12.07, SD = 2.59, range: 5.42–19.37), there were additional
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cross-sectional data on school grades.
The SB5 standardization sample consists of 1,829 participants from Switzerland,
Germany, Austria, and Liechtenstein. Complete data on all IQs were available for all
1,829 participants (51.4% female; age in years: M = 23.46, SD = 20.02, range:
4.00–83.96). Around one third (29.4%) of participants—or for children and adolescents,
their mothers—had a university degree, 8.8% of participants were bilingual (German
and at least one other native language), 7.8% were nonnative speakers (German not
their native language), and 2.9% reported having an AD(H)D diagnosis. For a
subsample of 249 individuals (47.4% female; age in years: M = 11.31, SD = 2.38, range:
5.79–17.68), there were additional cross-sectional data on school grades.
The RIAS standardization sample consists of 2,145 participants from Switzerland
and Germany. Complete data on all IQs were available for 2,109 participants (49.5%
female; age in years: M = 19.84, SD = 20.28, range: 3.00–99.96). About one fifth
(20.7%) of participants—or for children and adolescents, their mothers—had a
university degree, and 17.9% of participants were nonnative speakers (German not their
native language). For a subsample of 64 individuals, there were additional data on
school grades collected 2 to 4 years after the intelligence assessment (51.6% female; age
in years at T1: M = 9.02, SD = 1.02, range: 6.07–11.22, and at T2: M = 11.41, SD =
0.99, range: 9.00–14.00).
Materials
Intelligence Test Batteries. The IDS-2 assess cognitive (intelligence,
executive functions) as well as developmental (psychomotor skills, socioemotional skills,
basic skills, and motivation and attitude) in 5- to 20-year-olds with a total of 30
subtests (Grob & Hagmann-von Arx, 2018b; see Table S1 in the supplementary
material, https://osf.io/hfqe5/?view_only=b532b3b095ef417bb4dfa73a7e6c55e3).
The IDS-2 allow for the estimation of three different IQs. The Profile IQ (PrIQIDS-2) is
based on all 14 subtests that also constitute a profile of the following seven group
factors, each estimated by two subtests: Visual Processing, Long-Term Memory,
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Processing Speed, Auditory Short-Term Memory, Visual-Spatial Short-Term Memory,
Abstract Reasoning, and Verbal Reasoning. The first seven subtests (one per factor)
constitute an IQ without a factor profile (FSIQIDS-2). Additionally, the two subtests
with the highest g loadings in a confirmatory factor analysis of the first seven
subtests—Completing Matrices and Naming Categories—constitute the ScrIQ
(ScrIQIDS-2). Finally, the IDS-2 include a rating of the participation of the testee during
testing with 12 questions answered by the test administrator at the end of the
intelligence, executive functions, and developmental functions assessments. Here, we
used the answers on the intelligence assessment only.
The SB5 are an intelligence test battery for 4- to 83-year-olds that include a total
of 10 subtests (Grob et al., 2019a; see Table S1 for descriptions). The following five
group factors can be estimated based on one verbal and one nonverbal subtest each:
Fluid Reasoning, Knowledge, Quantitative Reasoning, Visual-Spatial Processing, and
Working Memory. Additionally, the five verbal and five nonverbal subtests are used for
a Verbal and a Nonverbal IQ. All 10 subtests are used for an FSIQ (FSIQSB5) and the
two routing subtests—Nonverbal Fluid Reasoning and Verbal Knowledge—constitute
the Abbreviated Battery IQ (ABIQ; hereafter called the ScrIQSB5). Finally, the SB5
include a rating of the participant’s understanding of instructions and cooperation in
the test situation with one question each answered by the test administrator at the end
of the test session.
The RIAS measure verbal and nonverbal intellectual abilities as well as memory
with two subtests each (six in total) in 3- to 99-year-olds (Hagmann-von Arx & Grob,
2014a; see Table S1 for descriptions). The two corresponding subtests are used to form
a Verbal Intelligence Index, a Nonverbal Intelligence Index, and a Memory Index. All
four intelligence subtests are used for an FSIQ (FSIQRIAS). Additionally, one verbal and
one nonverbal intelligence subtest—Guess What and Odd-Item Out—constitute the
Reynolds Intellectual Screening Test (RIST; hereafter called the ScrIQRIAS).
Having seven available IQs thus enabled five comparisons: three for the IDS-2, one
for the SB5, and one for the RIAS. The FSIQs from all three test batteries differ from
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each other in terms of number and content of subtests, whereas all ScrIQs consist of one
subtest each measuring fluid reasoning and comprehension knowledge (see Table S2 for
broad abilities tapped by each IQ). For the PrIQIDS-2 and FSIQIDS-2, as well as for the
FSIQRIAS and ScrIQRIAS, only the number of subtests, and not the content, differs, as
the corresponding IQs tap the same broad abilities in equal shares. In contrast, for the
PrIQIDS-2/FSIQIDS-2 and ScrIQIDS-2, as well as for the FSIQSB5 and ScrIQSB5, content
and number of subtests differ.
Participant and Parent Questionnaires. Adolescent and adult participants
and/or—for children and adolescents—their parents reported on demographic variables,
including age, sex, education (additionally for children and adolescents: education of
the parents), native language, and psychological and physical abnormalities (including
AD[H]D). In an additional questionnaire, some parents reported their child’s school
grades in German (instructional language), mathematics, social studies, geography and
history (combined), and science from the last two school semesters.
Procedure
Participants were recruited through schools and psychosocial institutions for
children and adolescents in Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. For the IDS-2,
administration of the whole test battery took between 3 and 4 h and, if necessary, could
be split into two sessions no more than 1 week apart. Administration of the intelligence
part alone took approximately 1.5 h and was completed within one test session. For the
SB5, administration took 1.5 to 2 h and for the RIAS it took around 30 to 40 min.
Written consent was obtained from children and adolescents (10 years and older) and/or
from their parents (5- to 15-year-olds). The demographic questionnaire was
administered at the beginning of the first session. The parental report of school grades
was completed at home either within weeks after the session (IDS-2 and SB5) or as part
of a follow-up study 2 to 4 years after the intelligence assessment (RIAS). Participants
from Switzerland received a gift card of their own choice worth 30 (IDS-2) or 20 (SB5
and RIAS) Swiss francs and participants from Germany and Austria received 25
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(IDS-2) or 12 (SB5 and RIAS) euros in cash for participation.
Statistical Analyses
All analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2019). Within each test battery,
we first inspected group-level comparability of IQs with Pearson correlations (both
uncorrected and corrected for unreliability of both IQs) and paired samples t tests. For
individual-level comparability, we then calculated intraindividual absolute differences in
IQ points.
To compare the IQs’ external validity, we performed linear regressions of school
grades on IQ. All grades were transformed into Swiss school grades, ranging from 1
(lowest) to 6 (highest). In our study, we focused on grades in German and mathematics
as well as on the grade point average (GPA). The GPA was computed as the average of
all reported grades for each participant. As the IQs were expected to be highly
correlated, we included them in separate models and compared the resulting R2s and
95% CIs for standardized regression coefficients (betas). Because the models were not
nested, we could not determine the significance of the change in R2. Instead, following
Cumming (2009), we regarded two betas as significantly different from one another if
their 95% CIs overlapped to a degree of 50% or less.
To examine possible explanations for IQ differences, we explored several possible
predictors, specifically, age, sex, AD(H)D (yes vs. no), native language (monolingual
German [reference] vs. bilingual and vs. other native language), IQ level (average [85 ≤
IQ ≤ 115, reference] vs. below average [IQ < 85] and vs. above average [IQ > 115]),
education of the participant or—for children and adolescents—of their mother
(university degree vs. no university degree), participation in the test situation (for
IDS-2; age-standardized scores with M = 10 and SD = 3), cooperation in the test
situation (for SB5; yes vs. no/partly), understanding of instructions (for SB5; yes vs.
no/partly), and the interaction between IQ and age. To account for the distribution of
the dependent variable—IQ differences (see Figure S1)—we used gamma generalized
linear models (GLMs) with a log link function. Following suggestions from Gelman
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(2008), we standardized all predictor variables by dividing by 2 SDs. We deemed an
effect significant if both the overall model (determined with a likelihood ratio test) and
the predictor were significant at an alpha level of .05. To illustrate the variation of IQ
differences across IQ and age, we compared the resulting difference scores across IQ
(including six IQ groups: < 70, 70–84, 85–99, 100–114, 115–129, ≥ 130; see Figure 1)
and across age (including different age groups depending on the test battery; see Figure
2). The IQ groups were based on the IQ with the largest number of subtests for each
test battery (i.e., the PrIQIDS-2, FSIQSB5, and FSIQRIAS). The same IQs were used for
the predictor of IQ level in regression analyses.
To explore possible solutions to incomparability, we computed 95% CIs using the
standard error of estimate (SEE) together with the estimated true score (Lord &
Novick, 1968; see also Dudek, 1979). For each test battery, we then calculated the
percentage of participants for whom the 95% CIs for the IQs overlapped. We varied the
reliability coefficients used for the calculation of 95% CIs to investigate their influence
on individual-level comparability. The 95% CIs were based on overall internal
consistencies (95CI; for IDS-2 and RIAS: Cronbach’s alphas and for SB5: split-half
reliabilities), age-specific internal consistencies (95CIage; see Table S9 for age groups),
and test–retest reliabilities (95CIrtt) obtained from the test manuals (Grob, Gygi, &
Hagmann-von Arx, 2019b; Grob & Hagmann-von Arx, 2018a; Hagmann-von Arx &
Grob, 2014b). Additionally, we calculated 95% CIs based on age- and IQ-specific
internal consistencies according to the manuals using a formula provided by Lienert and
Raatz (1998, p. 330; 95CIageIQ; e.g., for 5- to 6-year-olds with IQ < 85; see Table 4 for
IQ and age groups). Finally, we investigated the comparability of the IQs’
corresponding nominal categories (NomIQ; < 70 = “lower extreme,” 70–84 = “below
average,” 85–115 = “average,” 116–130 = “above average,” > 130 = “upper extreme”;
see also Grob, Meyer, & Hagmann-von Arx, 2013) as well as the comparability of the
95% CIs with overall internal consistencies in nominal categories (NomCI; e.g., average
to above average for an interval of 112 to 120). For each of these six resulting
criteria—95CI, 95CIage, 95CIageIQ, 95CIrtt, NomIQ, and NomCI—two IQs were deemed
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comparable on an individual level if their intervals overlapped. Just as for IQ
differences, we compared the percentages of participants with overlapping intervals
across IQ and age using the same groups.
Results
Group-Level Analyses
The seven IQs considered were normally distributed; their means were close to 100
(99.53 to 100.11) and standard deviations close to 15 (14.49 to 15.11, see Table 1). The
FSIQIDS-2 had the narrowest range with 55 to 142, and the ScrIQRIAS had the widest
range with 40 to 160. We compared the IQs within each test battery using t tests and
Pearson correlations and found very small mean differences that were non-significant in
all but one case (d = -0.002 for the FSIQIDS-2 vs. the ScrIQIDS-2 to d = 0.031 for the
the FSIQRIAS vs. the ScrIQRIAS), the latter being significant, t(2108) = 3.73, p < .001.
Intercorrelations both uncorrected and corrected for unreliability of both IQs were all
significant and high to very high (r = .76 for the FSIQSB5 and the ScrIQSB5 to r = .95
for the PrIQIDS-2 and the FSIQIDS-2, and rcorr = .77 for the FSIQSB5 and the ScrIQSB5
to rcorr = .99 for the FSIQRIAS and the ScrIQRIAS, all with p < .001).
Intraindividual Differences
The mean (and median) intraindividual absolute differences ranged between 3.68
(Mdn = 3) IQ points for the PrIQIDS-2 versus the FSIQIDS-2 and 8.12 (Mdn = 7) IQ
points for the FSIQSB5 versus the ScrIQSB5, with ranges between 0 and 20 (PrIQIDS-2 vs.
FSIQIDS-2 and FSIQRIAS vs. ScrIQRIAS) and 0 and 39 IQ points (FSIQIDS-2 vs.
ScrIQIDS-2; see Table 2). The relative differences were normally distributed around 0
(see Figure S2). Absolute differences across IQ groups and age are displayed in Figures
1 and 2, respectively (see also Table S3). For most comparisons, differences tended to
increase with higher IQs and for the PrIQIDS-2 versus the FSIQIDS-2 and the FSIQRIAS
versus the ScrIQRIAS, they tended to decrease with lower IQs. Regarding age,
differences were lowest for middle childhood for the FSIQSB5 versus the ScrIQSB5, but
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highest for the same age period for the FSIQRIAS versus the ScrIQRIAS. Otherwise,
differences showed little variation across age.
Differential Relationships With School Grades
To compare the IQs’ external validity, we investigated their differential
relationships with school grades in German and mathematics, and with the GPA.
Comparisons of 95% CIs for the betas revealed that the relationship with the FSIQ was
significantly higher than that with the ScrIQ only for the SB5 and mathematics (see
Figure S3 and Table S4).
In a post hoc analysis, we repeated the external validity analyses for subsamples
with small (below median) and large (above median) IQ differences to see how
incomparability might affect external validity (see Figure 3 and Table S5). For
individuals with small IQ differences, we found small to medium relationships that were
all highly significant (β = .29 for the FSIQIDS-2 and German to β = .52 for the
ScrIQRIAS and German, all with p < .001), and there were no significant differences in
betas between IQs. For individuals with large IQ differences, however, betas were still
significant for the IDS-2 and SB5 (β = .18, p = .008 for the ScrIQIDS-2 and mathematics
to β = .46, p < .001 for FSIQSB5 and mathematics), but lower for the SB5 and no
longer significant for the RIAS (β = .01, p = .965 for the FSIQRIAS and mathematics to
β = .12, p = .483 for the ScrIQRIAS and mathematics). For the IDS-2 and SB5,
relationships with the ScrIQ were also consistently smaller compared to those with the
FSIQ and the PrIQ, although for both, this difference in betas was only significant for
mathematics (see Figure 3).
Possible Predictors of IQ Differences
Next, we investigated possible predictors of IQ differences. Only the models for
the comparisons of the PrIQIDS-2 versus the ScrIQIDS-2, the FSIQSB5 versus the
ScrIQSB5, and the FSIQRIAS versus the ScrIQRIAS were significant. Therein, IQ level
and age and/or their interaction were the only consistent predictors (see Table 3, see
Table S6 for results for all comparisons). Larger differences occurred for younger
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individuals for two comparisons: for individuals with a below-average IQ for two
comparisons, and for individuals with an above-average IQ for one comparison. Finally,
there was a significant interaction effect for age and below-average IQ for one
comparison and for age and above-average IQ for another comparison (see
supplementary material for a detailed description of results).
Comparability Using Different Criteria
Table 4 shows the reliabilities and widths of the corresponding 95% CIs for all
seven IQs. The width of the 95% CIs based on overall internal consistencies ranged
between 6 (FSIQSB5) and 15 (ScrIQRIAS) IQ points. Those based on age-specific
internal consistencies and test–retest reliabilities were considerably larger, and those
based on age- and IQ-specific internal consistencies reached up to 30 IQ points for some
combinations of IQ > 115 and different age groups. The lowest age- and IQ-specific
internal consistencies, resulting in the largest CIs, were found exclusively in groups with
IQ > 115 and did not coincide with the lowest sample sizes for any of the IQs.
The percentage of participants with comparable IQs (i.e., overlapping intervals)
varied considerably across the different criteria and across IQ and age groups (see
Figure 4 and Tables S7 to S12). With the 95CI criterion, overall comparability was
between 60.5% and 98.7%. Across IQ groups it ranged between 27.8% and 99.6% and
across age groups between 50.7% and 100%.
The overall comparability was lowest for the NomIQ (69.9% to 87.5%) and the
95CI (60.5% to 98.7%) criteria and highest for the 95CIrtt (94.3% to 100.0%) and the
95CIageIQ (96.7% to 99.9%) criteria. The same pattern was evident across IQ and age
groups, with the lowest comparability for the NomIQ and the 95CI and highest
comparability for the 95CIrtt and the 95CIageIQ. In general, comparability was lowest for
the comparison of the FSIQSB5 versus the ScrIQSB5 and highest for the comparison of
the FSIQRIAS versus the ScrIQRIAS.
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Discussion
The primary objective of this study was to investigate the individual-level
comparability and external validity of different IQs derived from the same test battery.
As expected, all IQs were highly intercorrelated and—with one exception—there were
no significant mean differences. Despite this high correspondence on the group level,
individual-level comparability was not always satisfactory. Intraindividual absolute
differences reached up to 39 IQ points and tended to be larger for above-average IQ and
younger ages. However, with respect to external validity, the PrIQ and the FSIQ
explained more variance in school grades compared to the ScrIQ only for individuals
with large IQ differences and only for the IDS-2 and the SB5, with significant
differences only for mathematics. Regarding possible explanations, IQ level and age,
and/or their interaction, were the only consistent predictors of IQ differences. Finally,
regarding possible solutions, comparability varied considerably across criteria and again
across both IQ and age within a comparison and between comparisons. While
comparability for the NomIQ and 95CI was often unsatisfactory, it was very high for
the 95CIrtt and 95CIageIQ.
Group-Level Comparability and Intraindividual Differences
On the group level, all IQs within each test battery were highly comparable, with
the exception of the FSIQRIAS and ScrIQRIAS, where we found a significant mean
difference despite a very high correlation. However, the effect size was very small,
suggesting the effect is negligible. Despite high comparability on the group level,
intraindividual absolute differences between IQs varied considerably, from 0 to more
than 2.5 SDs, with means between a fourth and over half a standard deviation,
depending on the comparison. It is important to note that there were no systematic
differences in one direction (one IQ being systematically higher than the other) as the
relative differences were normally distributed around 0 for all comparisons. The mean
IQ differences were slightly lower than those found in previous studies investigating
individual-level comparability of FSIQs between test batteries (Bünger et al., 2019;
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Floyd et al., 2008; Hagmann-von Arx et al., 2018). Still, the size of the differences seems
remarkable, given that the subtests for the ScrIQ are fully included in the FSIQ and the
PrIQ, and the subtests for the FSIQ are fully included in the PrIQ, that transient error
is kept to a minimum, and that between-battery variance is ruled out completely.
Differential External Validity
Analyses on differential external validity revealed that the PrIQ and the FSIQ had
significantly stronger relationships with school grades compared to the ScrIQ only for
participants with large IQ differences and only for the IDS-2 and the SB5 and
mathematics. These two comparisons—PrIQIDS-2 versus ScrIQIDS-2 and FSIQSB5 versus
ScrIQSB5—also featured the largest IQ differences. Further, there were no differences in
relationships between the PrIQIDS-2 and the FSIQIDS-2. Apparently, the ScrIQs miss
aspects of intelligence that are contained in the PrIQ and FSIQs that are especially
important for mathematical achievement. For the IDS-2, this probably concerns
additional working memory aspects (tapped at least in part by the two/four short-term
memory subtests) and visual-spatial skills (tapped by the [two] Visual Processing and
the [two] Visual-Spatial Short-Term Memory subtests; see Table S1) tapped by the
FSIQ/PrIQ but not the ScrIQ, as these abilities are known to be especially related to
mathematical achievement (e.g., Bull & Lee, 2014; Kahl, Grob, Segerer, & Möhring,
2019; McCrink & Opfer, 2014). For the SB5, displaying the largest difference between
the FSIQ and ScrIQ, the incremental validity of the FSIQ is probably mostly due to the
two Quantitative Knowledge subtests, in addition to the two Working Memory and two
Visual-Spatial Processing subtests.
Moreover, relationships were smaller for individuals with large compared to small
IQ differences for the SB5 and the RIAS, to the point that for the RIAS, they were no
longer significant for individuals with large IQ differences. Although the sample sizes
were small for the RIAS here, and therefore findings have to be interpreted with
caution, it is still important to take a closer look at this particular finding, as it is
consistent and based on a longitudinal analysis. This finding might indicate that for
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individuals with larger discrepancies between different IQs, it is possible that none of
these IQs predict school grades in the long run.
From these findings we conclude that an IQ based on more subtests is not
necessarily a better predictor for school grades compared to one based on fewer
subtests, especially for individuals with low IQ differences. We also conclude that larger
IQ differences do have consequences for external validity, as the IQs for which larger
intraindividual differences occurred were also the ones with larger disparities in
relationships with school grades, and as relationships tended to be lower in general for
individuals with high IQ differences. For these individuals, relationships with the ScrIQ
also tended to be lower compared to those with the FSIQ and the PrIQ, especially for
mathematics. In these cases, differences in content seem to be more important than
differences in the number of subtests per se.
Possible Explanations
If the IQ differences we found are not entirely due to random error, they most
likely stem from (stable) characteristics of the testee and/or of the composites
themselves. Our results suggest that the first possibility (i.e., characteristics of the
testee) is likely part of the answer, as IQ differences varied across IQ and age, and those
two and/or their interaction were the only systematic predictors in regression analyses.
In this respect, our results are in line with Hagmann-von Arx et al. (2018) and Bünger
et al. (2019), where IQ differences were larger for younger participants for some
comparisons and larger at the tails of the IQ distribution for some (Hagmann-von Arx
et al., 2018) or most (Bünger et al., 2019) comparisons as well. In our study (and not
investigated in previous studies) there were also significant interaction effects between
IQ level and age, indicating these two variables should be considered in conjunction
with each other when calculating reliability coefficients. Finally, the included predictors
explained a significant amount of variance for only three of the five comparisons. It is
likely that other variables that could not be sufficiently considered in the present study
contribute to systematic variance in IQ differences, for example (achievement)
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motivation, attention span, or alertness. Thus, there are two characteristics of the
testee (i.e., IQ and age) that explain some of the variance in IQ differences. The second
source of systematic variability introduced above (i.e., characteristics of the composites)
therefore likely played a role as well. Three such characteristics are number, g loadings,
and content of subtests going into the composites. As mentioned above, Farmer et al.
(2019) showed that the most accurate composites are those derived from numerous (12
to 13) diverse and highly g-loaded subtests, where high g loadings are more important
compared to heterogeneity. Their results also suggest that composites based on four
subtests might be accurate enough, but fewer than four subtests resulted in substantial
losses of accuracy. In line with common practice, the ScrIQs from the three test
batteries included in our study are all composed of only two subtests. Further, although
all three ScrIQs fulfill the heterogeneity criterion with the two subtests representing two
different broad abilities (namely, fluid reasoning and comprehension knowledge), only
the subtests for the ScrIQIDS-2 were chosen based on the highest g loadings. The
ScrIQSB5 is composed of the subtests with the lowest (Nonverbal Fluid Reasoning) and
third lowest (Verbal Knowledge) g loading (Grob et al., 2019b), which might at least
partly explain the larger differences we found for the SB5 compared to the IDS-2 and
the RIAS.
Subtest content may also explain some of the variance in individual-level
comparability between the different comparisons. In this regard, it is especially
interesting to compare the comparisons of the PrIQIDS-2 versus the FSIQIDS-2 and the
FSIQRIAS versus the ScrIQRIAS. Both comparisons have the same degree of overlap in
content (100%, see Table 4) and the same ratio of subtests (2:1) but different absolute
numbers of subtests (4 and 2 vs. 14 and 7) and different numbers of broad abilities
tapped (2 vs. 7). Differences for the PrIQIDS-2 versus the FSIQIDS-2 are slightly lower
than for the FSIQRIAS versus the ScrIQRIAS, but both are considerably lower compared
to the other comparisons.
From these considerations we conclude that larger overlap in content and high g
loadings seem to be more important than the sheer number of subtests for high
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individual-level comparability. However, as our set of comparisons is very limited, these
findings clearly need replication, ideally with comparisons of composites systematically
varied in content, g loadings, and number of subtests.
Possible Solutions
We explored several alternatives to specific IQ scores—nominal categories and
95% CIs based on different reliability coefficients—with the aim of achieving a more
dependable intelligence estimate. Results on percentages of participants with
overlapping 95% CIs or nominal IQs reflect results on IQ differences in that they varied
both between the different comparisons and across IQ and age. Although all
investigated criteria consider unreliability in one way or another, comparability still
tended to be lower at younger ages and toward the tails of the IQ distribution.
Furthermore, comparability varied considerably between the different criteria.
Although the overall percentages of participants with overlap of the 95CI and the
NomIQ tended to be higher compared to those found in previous studies on
between-battery comparisons (Bünger et al., 2019; Hagmann-von Arx et al., 2018), they
were still unsatisfactory. Especially when calculated separately for IQ and age groups,
the percentage of participants with comparable IQs was sometimes very low, down to
27.8%, which is comparable to results from Bünger et al. (2019). Rates of comparability
were higher for the 95CIage and the NomCI, criteria but the highest rates were achieved
with the 95CIrtt or the 95CIageIQ criteria. This is to be expected, given that the
intervals were also often widest for these criteria compared to the other criteria. Which
of the two—95CIrtt or 95CIageIQ—provides a better trade-off between comparability and
precision (in terms of interval width) is difficult to pin down as this varies across IQs
and across IQ comparisons. At this point, it is important to note that we had to rely on
fairly rough groups for IQ (< 85, 85–115, and > 115) and for age in adulthood (e.g., age
30–59 years for the SB5 and age 21–59 years for the RIAS). Additionally, group sizes
varied considerably and were sometimes very low (IDS-2: n = 31 to n = 352; SB5: n =
15 to n = 222; RIAS: n = 23 to n = 175). The comparability versus precision trade-off
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could probably be improved for the 95CIageIQ if larger, more fine-graded groups were
considered, which would necessitate sampling more participants of diverse ages at the
tails of the IQ distribution. Finally, both internal consistency and test–retest reliability
miss certain kinds of measurement error. While internal consistency does not consider
transient error (see above), test–retest reliability does not consider specific factor error
(i.e., errors due to individual interpretation of items; Schmidt et al., 2003). Therefore,
although we recommend both test–retest reliability and age- and IQ-specific internal
consistencies over one overall internal consistency as a basis for CIs, other approaches
may be even more beneficial. The coefficient of equivalence and stability (CES;
Cronbach, 1947), for example, combines the advantages of internal consistency and
test–retest reliability and considers both specific factor error and transient error,
making it likely to be the best candidate as a basis for CIs. As CES requires the
administration of two parallel test forms on two different measurement occasions, we
were not able to consider this reliability coefficient in our study.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that more accurate confidence intervals can be
only part of the solution to incomparability, mainly as a means for practitioners to deal
with incomparability of results from existing intelligence tests. Given the substantial
differences we found, the consequences they have for validity, and the large intervals
needed to achieve satisfactory individual-level comparability, the long-term goal must
be to create more accurate intelligence measures. To achieve a higher individual-level
comparability, it might be necessary to question our current understanding of general
intelligence and to refrain from multidimensional measures (i.e., subtests intended to
measure both general intelligence and a broad ability; see also Beaujean & Benson,
2019). Instead, test developers could try to create unidimensional measures of specific
broad abilities—including clean fluid reasoning measures as a substitute for currently
used general intelligence composites—with a firmer theoretical and neurological basis
(e.g., Beaujean & Benson, 2019; Kovacs & Conway, 2019).
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Implications
Our findings have implications for the construction, validation, and application of
intelligence tests. For test construction and application, these findings raise awareness
that choosing the subtests with the highest g loadings (i.e., those most representative
for the whole scale) for a short form does not necessarily result in comparable results to
those for the full test battery. However, it is certainly better than choosing subtests
with lower g loadings (see also Farmer et al., 2019).
Moreover, our results indicate that in terms of both individual-level comparability
and external validity there are no large gains between the 7- and 14-subtest composites
(the FSIQ and the PrIQ, respectively) for the IDS-2. In line with results from Farmer et
al. (2019), this suggests a diminishing marginal utility of additional subtests—especially
if they do not introduce other broad abilities—from a certain number of subtests on.
Our finding of the importance of content for comparability suggests that when
constructing a short form or short test—under the current conception of intelligence as
a construct comprising different factors or broad abilities (McGrew, 2009; reservations
discussed above notwithstanding)—it is likely better to tap more broad abilities with
one subtest each, at the cost of having no factor profile (e.g., four subtests that capture
four broad abilities), than to measure less broad abilities to have a factor profile (e.g.,
four subtests that together capture two broad abilities). The former should also render
a more accurate g in the sense of Jensen and Weng’s (1994) definition by providing a
more diverse set of subtests regarding content.
Finally, on the basis of our results, we argue against using one internal consistency
coefficient derived from the whole sample for the calculation of CIs. Instead, we
recommend the use of test–retest reliabilities, age- and IQ-specific internal consistencies
or, probably even better, the CES (Schmidt et al., 2003). The additional resources
spent on the construction and application of a parallel test form would likely be more
than compensated for by more accurate reliability estimates—and with this, more
accurate CIs—and even by the possibility to provide practitioners with a test battery
they could administer twice to the same testee without the interference of learning
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effects. Ideally, but of course difficult to implement in practice, the test–retest sample
should also be large enough to permit at least a rough division into IQ and age groups
to enable the use of age- and IQ-specific CESs for the calculation of CIs.
An important implication for practitioners is not to use specific IQ scores for
interpretation or communication of test results. Indeed, in line with Bünger et al.
(2019), our results show that even the 95% CI might not necessarily be valid enough for
clinical interpretation, but it is certainly more appropriate than a specific IQ score. As
has been done before (Bünger et al., 2019), we therefore again call for a paradigm shift
away from specific IQ scores toward intervals that consider the unreliability of IQ
measures in clinical interpretation. Instead of requiring an IQ score to fall above or
below a certain threshold, the upper and lower levels of the 95% CI should be
considered.
Many practitioners base decisions about the need for further testing on the
screening result (Thompson et al., 2004). If the result is atypical, they would consider
further testing; if not, they would refrain from further testing. However, our results
demonstrate that the differences between the FSIQ and the ScrIQ are largest especially
in those ranges where most clinical questions arise—namely, at the tails of the IQ
distribution. This is true even if 95% CIs are based on the expected true score, thus
accounting for regression to the mean. To avoid the risk of missing diagnostically
meaningful information, when time constraints are high, we suggest using a short test of
at least four subtests (see Farmer et al., 2019) instead of a screening with two subtests,
also for screening purposes. There is another context, gaining importance in many
Western countries, in which very short measures should be avoided: for testees with low
familiarity with (standardized) testing or test content as well as with difficulties in
understanding task instructions. Following insights from dynamic testing (Beckmann,
2014; Beckmann & Dobat, 2000; Cho & Compton, 2015; Guthke & Wiedl, 1996), test
performance of such testees increases in predictive validity with increasing time spent
with the tasks. For example, it was shown that in a test–retest design, performance in
the posttest was a better predictor for scholastic achievement compared to performance
APPENDIX B: Study II 96
in the pretest, especially for disadvantaged children (Guthke & Wiedl, 1996). The use
of a screening instrument thus bears the risk of underestimating an individual’s true
intellectual potential especially in these contexts.
Finally, IQ differences are linked to the prediction of school grades. For
individuals with higher IQ differences, relationships with school grades tended to be
lower in general, and especially for the ScrIQ. In the long run, IQ might not even be
predictive at all for school grades for individuals with high IQ differences. It is therefore
important to identify these individuals, for example, through multiple testing, and to be
aware of the possibility of reduced reliability and (external) validity of IQ in these cases.
Future research should determine to what extent the present results are applicable
to factor index scores as well. If two subtests are likely not enough for a general
intelligence measure, this should be even less appropriate for a factor index score, given
the small unique variance over and above g such factors already capture (e.g., Canivez,
Watkins, & Dombrowski, 2016; Dombrowski, 2014). We also advocate the use of
individual-level comparisons in addition to group-level analyses for validation of a test
procedure intended for individual diagnostics. More research is needed to further
investigate characteristics of both the testee and the test itself that lead to
individual-level comparability (or incomparability) of IQs. Moreover, further research is
needed to determine which reliability coefficient(s) should be used for the calculation of
CIs to achieve the best trade-off between individual-level comparability and precision,
with age- and IQ-specific CESs being a promising candidate. Finally, in addition to
internal and structural validation, a greater emphasis should be placed on external
validation, but also on diagnostic and treatment utility, of test scores to determine their
usefulness as a diagnostic instrument in practice.
Strengths and Limitations
For the first time, we investigated group- and individual-level comparability of IQs
within the same test battery for a set of three test batteries based on large,
representative samples covering a large age span from early childhood to late adulthood.
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In comparing IQs within test batteries, we were able to eliminate all kinds of variance
between test batteries or test situations, leaving characteristics of the testee and the
test itself as the only systematic sources of variance.
A limitation of this study is that we could form only broad IQ groups for age- and
IQ-specific 95% CIs (below average, average, above average) due to small sample sizes
within age groups. Greater oversampling of participants of different ages at the tails of
the IQ distribution is needed to achieve more fine-graded groups and with this to ensure
reliability and validity at the extremes.
Furthermore, we used school grades as a single criterion of external validity.
Although school grades are strongly related to IQ (Roth et al., 2015), future research
should consider differential relationships of IQs based on different numbers of subtests
with additional criteria for scholastic achievement, such as scholastic aptitude tests or
teacher ratings of school performance, as well as with criteria that are also valid for
adults, for example, educational attainment or occupational success.
Finally, we could include only a limited number of test batteries and composites in
our study. Systematic comparisons of the kind performed in Farmer et al.
(2019)—comparisons of composites systematically varied in characteristics such as
number, g loadings, and content of subtests—but on an individual level and within
multiple test batteries are needed to further clarify the number and nature of subtests
necessary to achieve an accurate measure of general intelligence.
Conclusion
Our findings raise awareness of the limitations of IQ screenings as a means to get
a first impression of an individual’s intellectual potential. Despite high comparability on
the group level, individual-level comparability of IQs derived from the same test battery
was often unsatisfactory. We therefore advocate acknowledging a lower reliability of IQs
to achieve more accurate intelligence assessments. One step in that direction would be
to refrain from using internal consistencies and to instead use test–retest reliabilities or,
probably even better, the CES (Cronbach, 1947) as a basis for CIs. The systematic
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effects of IQ level and age on IQ differences we found also suggest that reliabilities
should be computed separately for age and IQ groups. Most importantly, our results
demonstrate that the interpretation of specific IQ scores should be avoided. However,
despite limited comparability with the FSIQ, we found that ScrIQs did not necessarily
display less external validity. But IQs in general, and especially ScrIQs, tended to be
worse predictors of school grades, especially in mathematics, for individuals with large
intraindividual IQ differences.
To conclude, our results point to substantial intraindividual IQ differences that
have consequences for external validity and are at least in part explained by IQ level
and age. Our results demonstrate that a focus on CIs based on reasonable reliability
coefficients can be part of the solution to incomparability. Yet, further research is
needed to learn more about the number and kind of subtests necessary to achieve an
accurate measurement of general intelligence on the individual level.
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Table 2
Intraindividual Absolute Differences in IQs
Comparison Mean Median Range
PrIQIDS-2 vs. ScrIQIDS-2 7.94 7 0–37
FSIQIDS-2 vs. ScrIQIDS-2 7.00 6 0–39
PrIQIDS-2 vs. FSIQIDS-2 3.68 3 0–20
FSIQSB5 vs. ScrIQSB5 8.12 7 0–38
FSIQRIAS vs. ScrIQRIAS 4.37 4 0–20
Note. IDS-2: N = 1,622; SB5: N = 1,829; RIAS: N =
2,109. PrIQ = Profile IQ; FSIQ = Full-Scale IQ; ScrIQ
= Screening IQ; IDS-2 = Intelligence and Development
Scales–2; SB5 = Stanford–Binet Intelligence
Scales–Fifth Edition, German adaptation; RIAS =
Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales, German
adaptation.
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Table 3
Gamma Generalized Linear Models With Possible Predictors of Absolute Differences in
IQs
IDS-2 SB5 RIAS
Predictor PrIQ vs. ScrIQ FSIQ vs. ScrIQ FSIQ vs. ScrIQ
Age -0.00 -0.15 ** -0.08 *
Sex 0.00 0.03 0.03
AD(H)D 0.12 0.14
Native language
Bilingual -0.14 0.00 -0.01
Other language -0.04 ** 0.07 -0.01
Education 0.06 0.05 0.05
IQ level
Below-Average IQ 0.01 *** 0.07 0.27 ***
Above-Average IQ 0.06 0.26 0.17 **
Participation 0.00
Cooperation 0.05
Understanding 0.05
Age*Below-Average IQ -0.59 *** 0.12 -0.07
Age*Above-Average IQ -0.10 0.31 ** -0.16
Likelihood 24.04 * 27.45 ** 29.52 ***
Note. IDS-2: N = 1,566, SB5: N = 1,775, RIAS: N = 1,979. Displayed are regression coefficients
standardized by dividing by two standard deviations (Gelman, 2008). Sex: 0 = male, 1 = female;
AD(H)D: 0 = no, 1 = yes; Bilingual: 0 = German, 1 = bilingual; Other language: 0 = German, 1
= other native language; Education (of participants or their mothers): 0 = no university degree; 1
= university degree; Below average IQ: 0 = 85 ≤ IQ ≤ 115, 1 = IQ <85; Above average IQ: 0 = 85
≤ IQ ≤ 115, 1 = IQ >115; Cooperation (in the test situation) and Understanding (of instructions):
0 = yes, 1 = partly/no. AD(H)D = Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder or Attention deficit
disorder; Participation = participation in the test situation; IDS-2 = Intelligence and Development
Scales–2; SB5 = Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scales–Fifth Edition, German adaptation; RIAS =
Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales, German adaptation; PrIQ = Profile IQ; FSIQ =
Full-Scale IQ; ScrIQ = Screening IQ.
*p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.
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Figure 1 . Intraindividual absolute differences between IQs within each test battery,
plotted against the Profile IQ or Full-Scale IQ. The curve was fitted with general
additive modeling and is displayed with a 95% confidence band. The dashed line
indicates a difference of one standard deviation. IDS-2 = Intelligence and Development
Scales–2; SB5 = Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scales–Fifth Edition, German adaptation;
RIAS = Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales, German adaptation.
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Figure 2 . Intraindividual absolute differences between IQs within each test battery,
plotted against age (in years). The curve was fitted with general additive modeling and
is displayed with a 95% confidence band. The dashed line indicates a difference of 1 SD.
IDS-2 = Intelligence and Development Scales–2; SB5 = Stanford–Binet Intelligence
Scales–Fifth Edition, German adaptation; RIAS = Reynolds Intellectual Assessment
Scales, German adaptation.
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Figure 3 . Comparison of 95% confidence intervals for standardized beta coefficients for
IQs predicting school grades in German and mathematics and grade point average
(GPA), splitted into subsamples with participants with intraindividual absolute
differences in IQs below (IDS-2: n = 203, SB5: n = 122, RIAS: n = 29) and above
(IDS-2: n = 211, SB5: n = 127, RIAS: n = 35) the median. A difference in betas was
deemed significant if confidence intervals overlapped to a maximum of 50% (indicated in
red). Significant betas are in black, nonsignificant betas in gray. Data for the IDS-2 and
SB5 are cross-sectional; data for the RIAS are longitudinal. IDS-2 = Intelligence and
Development Scales–2; SB5 = Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scales–Fifth Edition, German
adaptation; RIAS = Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales, German adaptation; PrIQ
= Profile IQ; FSIQ = Full-Scale IQ; ScrIQ = Screening IQ.
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Figure 4 . Percentage of participants with comparable IQs (i.e., overlapping intervals)
determined by the following six criteria: NomIQ = IQ in nominal categories (e.g.,
“average” for IQ 85–115), 95CI = 95% CI with overall internal consistencies, 95CIage =
95% CI with age-specific internal consistencies, NomCI = 95% CIs with overall internal
consistencies in nominal categories, 95CIrtt = 95% CI with test–retest reliabilities, and
95CIageIQ = 95% CI with age- and IQ-specific internal consistencies. The percentage of
participants with comparable IQs both overall (black dots) and across IQ and age
groups (color palette) are displayed. Numbers are displayed for the IQ and age group
with the lowest percentage of participants with comparable IQs for each comparison.
Ages given in years. IDS-2 = Intelligence and Development Scales–2; SB5 =
Stanford–Binet Intelligence Scales–Fifth Edition, German adaptation; RIAS =
Reynolds Intellectual Assessment Scales, German adaptation; PrIQ = Profile IQ; FSIQ
= Full-Scale IQ; ScrIQ = Screening IQ; CI = confidence interval.
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Article
Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is one of the 
most often diagnosed neurobehavioral disorders in children 
with a worldwide prevalence of 5% in school-age children 
(Polanczyk, Silva de Lima, Horta, Biederman, & Rohde, 
2007). Boys are diagnosed with ADHD two to four times more 
often than girls (Schmidt & Petermann, 2009). In addition to 
its core symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsiv-
ity, ADHD is frequently accompanied by other symptoms, 
such as motor difficulties (Fliers et al., 2008), executive func-
tion deficits (Barkley, 1997; Hervey, Epstein, & Curry, 2004; 
Willcutt, Doyle, Nigg, Faraone, & Pennington, 2005), and 
functional impairment, including learning problems (Loe & 
Feldman, 2007) and socioemotional difficulties (Maedgen & 
Carlson, 2000). These difficulties often accompany an ADHD 
diagnosis and are therefore here called accessory symptoms. 
The presence of early coexisting difficulties in motor develop-
ment (Rasmussen & Gillberg, 2000) or executive functioning 
(Rinsky & Hinshaw, 2011) enhances the risk of poor psycho-
social functioning. Hence examining potential accessory 
symptoms has been recommended (Subcommittee on 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Steering Committee 
on Quality Improvement and Management, 2011).
Although there are clear diagnostic criteria for ADHD 
in the international classification systems (Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed. [DSM-5]; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013; International 
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems, 10th ed. [ICD-10]; World Health Organization, 
1990), as well as guidelines to assess the aforementioned 
accessory symptoms, there is an ongoing debate on how to 
measure them, as different methods exist to assess the same 
symptoms. Clinical interviews, questionnaires, and perfor-
mance-based measures (or their combination) are common 
methods to assess ADHD core and accessory symptoms. 
Therefore, it is necessary to know the advantages and dis-
advantages of each method and whether performance- and 
observer-based methods yield comparable results. This 
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Abstract
Objective: We examined whether children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) differ from children 
without ADHD in attention, executive functions, and motor skills and whether measures of parents’ perceptions and 
children’s performance reveal comparable results. Method: About 52 children with ADHD and 52 children without 
ADHD aged 6 to 13 years completed performance-based measures of attention, executive functions, and motor skills. 
Parents completed questionnaires to rate their children’s skills. Results: Parent questionnaires but not performance-based 
measures revealed higher inattention and lower executive function skills in children with ADHD compared to controls. 
For motor skills, both measurement methods revealed lower mean values and a higher number of children showing an 
impairment in the ADHD group. Parent-reported difficulties but not performance-based measures were related to the 
presence of an ADHD diagnosis. Conclusion: Our findings suggest that considering both parent questionnaires and 
performance-based measures will lead to a comprehensive picture of a child’s strengths and difficulties. (J. of Att. Dis. XXXX; 
XX[X] XX-XX)
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question is the subject of the present study, which focused 
on attention as a core symptom and executive functions 
and motor skills as accessory symptoms of ADHD.
Questionnaires are time-saving, practical to use, and 
inexpensive. Moreover, they have the advantage of being 
able to assess the same symptoms in multiple respondents 
(Levy, Kronenberger, & Dunn, 2017). However, question-
naires reflect the respondent’s perceptions and might there-
fore be subject to perspective biases (Pierrehumbert, Bader, 
Thévoz, Kinal, & Halfon, 2006), resulting in differences 
across informants who rate the same item. For instance, the 
correspondence between child-, parent-, and teacher reports 
was found to be low to modest with r = .16 to .52 for 
ADHD core and cognitive accessory symptoms (Caye, 
Machado, & Rohde, 2017; Duhig, Renk, Epstein, & Phares, 
2000; Du Rietz et al., 2016; Pierrehumbert et al., 2006; 
Salwina et al., 2013) but strong with r = .54 for motor skills 
as accessory symptoms (Fliers et al., 2008). Among parents, 
disagreement can be found between mothers and fathers, 
with mothers tending to report more symptoms than fathers 
(Caye et al., 2017). Performance-based measures of atten-
tion, executive functions, and motor skills are more time 
consuming and more expensive compared to question-
naires. Nevertheless, a clear advantage of performance-
based measures is the objectivity of results.
Both questionnaires and performance-based measures 
showed differences in attention, executive functions, and 
motor skills between children with and without ADHD (Fliers 
et al., 2008; Fried, Hirshfeld-Becker, Petty, Batchelder, & 
Biederman, 2015; Gioia, Isquith, Kenworthy, & Barton, 2002; 
Piek, Pitcher, & Hay, 1999): Regarding attention and execu-
tive functions, 15% to 89% of children with ADHD aged 7 to 
13 years were found to be impaired (T score ≥ 65) on various 
attention and executive function skills based on the parent-
rated Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function 
(BRIEF; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000; Inhibit, 
52%; Shift, 15%; Emotional Control, 26%; Initiate, 52%; 
Working Memory, 89%; Plan/Organize, 74%; Organization 
of Materials, 48%; Monitor, 63%; Gioia et al., 2002). Another 
study using seven subtests of the performance-based measure 
Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery 
(CANTAB; Fried et al., 2015; Verbal Recognition Memory, 
Intra-Extra Dimensional Set Shift [IED], Spatial Working 
Memory, Stockings of Cambridge [SOC], Reaction Time, 
Rapid Visual Information Processing [RVP], Affective Go/
No-Go) found 77% of children and adolescents with ADHD 
aged 8 to 15 years to have impairment (Z score < –1) on at 
least one attention and executive function measure, 52% on at 
least two measures, and 23% on at least three measures (Fried 
et al., 2015). Regarding motor skills, a study based on parent 
and teacher ratings on the Developmental Coordination 
Disorder Questionnaire (DCDQ; Kennedy-Behr, Wilson, 
Rodger, & Mickan, 2013) found one-third of children with 
ADHD aged 5 to 19 years to be impaired (raw score < 10th 
percentile of normal controls) on the total DCD score (Fliers 
et al., 2008). Another study assessing motor skills with the 
performance-based Movement Assessment Battery for 
Children (MABC; Henderson & Sugden, 1992) found that 
56% to 68% of children with ADHD aged 8 to 11 years 
showed problematic motor skills (total score < 16th percen-
tile) and 31% showed a severe general motor impairment 
(total score < 5th percentile; Piek et al., 1999). Thus, it can be 
concluded that differential validity regarding ADHD is given 
for both methods. However, the abovementioned studies dif-
fer in definitions and cut-off values for impairments as well as 
in sample characteristics (e.g., age of subjects) and can there-
fore hardly be compared. Regarding attention and executive 
functions, previous studies showed that performance-based 
measures and parent ratings are not highly correlated although 
they both seem too reveal difficulties in ADHD children or 
other clinical samples (e.g., Anderson, Anderson, Northam, 
Jacobs, & Mikiewicz, 2002; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 
2013). However, less is known about the comparability of 
both methods for motor skills in ADHD children. Therefore, 
the current study addresses this issue by including attention, 
executive functions, and motor skills in one sample, applying 
comparable cut-off values for all three constructs.
As a first aim of the present study, we examined differ-
ences in parent-reported and performance-based attention, 
executive functions, and motor skills between children with 
and without ADHD (controls). In line with previous research, 
we hypothesized that children with ADHD would show more 
difficulties in attention, more problems in executive func-
tions, and lower levels of motor skills compared to controls 
(group level; mean comparisons), and that these differences 
would emerge with both measurement methods (i.e., parent 
questionnaires and performance-based measures). Second, 
we hypothesized that the number of children showing an 
impairment in attention, executive functions, or motor skills 
would differ between children with and without ADHD 
(individual level; impairment comparisons). Assuming that 
parent questionnaires and performance-based measures are 
comparably valid measures to assess attention, executive 
functions, and motor skills, we finally explored the incre-
mental predictive power of performance-based measures of 
attention, executive functions, and motor skills above parent 
questionnaire reports.
Method
Participants
The present study included 52 (out of 55) children with 
ADHD (Mage = 10.19 years, SD = 1.57; range: 7 to 13 
years; 43 boys [83%], 9 girls [17%]) and 52 (out of 98) 
sex- and age-matched children without ADHD (control 
group; Mage = 10.13 years, SD = 1.64; range: 6 to 13 
years; 43 boys [83%], 9 girls [17%]). All children attended 
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public primary school in Switzerland. Control children 
were recruited from local schools. Children with ADHD 
were recruited from and diagnosed by privately practicing 
pediatricians and the University Children’s Hospital Basel. 
The diagnoses were based on Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) or ICD-10 criteria and 
relied on parent interviews, questionnaires as well as psy-
chological tests and medical checks to rule our other con-
ditions. The presence or absence of an ADHD or any 
further diagnosis was confirmed by parents upon study 
enrollment. Three of 55 invited children with ADHD 
refused participation. Totally, 38 (73%) of the children 
with ADHD were on stimulant medication and discontin-
ued ingestion 24 hr before testing, following the standard 
recommendation (Barkley, 1995; Thompson, 2007). None 
of the included children was diagnosed with autism spec-
trum disorder or met the criteria for intellectual disability 
(IQ < 70). (Co)-existing developmental disorders (e.g., 
learning disorders) are reported in Supplemental Table 1.
Procedure
Between May 2013 and May 2014 parents and children 
visited the laboratory at the University of Basel. Children 
completed performance-based measures of attention, 
executive functions, motor skills, and intelligence and 
parents were asked to complete questionnaires while the 
investigation of their children was taking place. Due to 
restrictions in testing time, a few children could not be 
assessed with all measures. The Ethics Committee of 
Northwest and Central Switzerland approved the study 
protocol. Written informed consent was obtained from 
parents for the children to participate and assent was 
obtained from each child.
Materials
Attention and executive functions
Parent questionnaire. Attention and executive functions 
were assessed using the short German version of the Con-
ners Questionnaire for parents (3rd ed., Conners 3; Lidzba, 
Christiansen, & Drechsler, 2013). Parents were asked to rate 
the 42 items on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 
(not at all/never) to 3 (very much/very frequently). Higher 
scores indicate greater problems in attention and execu-
tive functions. Cronbach’s alpha was .84 for the Executive 
Function scale and .90 for the Inattention scale.
Performance-based measure. Attention and executive 
functions were measured using four CANTAB (Fray, Rob-
bins, & Sahakian, 1996) subtests. The Rapid Visual Pro-
cessing (RVP; signal detection sensitivity) subtest assesses 
visual sustained attention, with higher scores indicating 
better sustained attention. The Intra-Extra Dimensional Set 
Shift (IED; mean errors) subtest assesses rule acquisition 
and reversal and shifting and flexibility of attention, with 
higher scores indicating lower flexibility of attention. The 
Stockings of Cambridge (SOC; problems solved in mini-
mum moves) subtest measures spatial planning and prob-
lem solving, with higher scores indicating better planning 
skills. The Spatial Working Memory (between errors) sub-
test measures retention and manipulation of visuospatial 
information, with higher scores indicating lower working 
memory skills. Cronbach’s alpha of the subtests are incon-
sistent, with high coefficients (α = .73 to .95) reported by 
Luciana (2003) and low coefficients (α < .70) reported by 
Syväoja and colleagues (2015).
Motor skills
Parent questionnaire. Parents were asked to rate their chil-
dren’s performance on motor activities using the German 
Table 1. Pearson Correlations for Attention and Executive Functions.
Scale
Conners 3 CANTAB
1 2 3 4 5 6
Conners 3
1. Inattention .73*** .02 .03 .06 .13
2. Executive functions .53***/.57*** .08 −.06 .13 .03
CANTAB
3. Sustained attention .26/.03 .14/.26 −.13 .21 −.24*
4. Shifting and flexibility of attention −.12/–.03 −.05/–.29 −.17/–.12 −.21 .30**
5. Spatial planning solved in minimum moves .20/–.09 .25/–.01 .16/.26 −.14/–.29 −.22
6. Spatial working memory between errors –.25/.16 −.13/–.10 −.27/–.23 .30/.22 −.18/–.30*  
Note. Values above the diagonal refer to the overall sample. Values before the solidus (/) refer to the attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder group. 
Values after the solidus (/) refer to the control group. Significant differences between groups appear in bold. Data controlled for socioeconomic status, 
children’s General Ability Index, age, and sex. Conners 3 = Conners Questionnaire for parents, 3rd edition; CANTAB = Cambridge Neuropsycho-
logical Test Automated Battery.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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version of the DCDQ (DCDQ-G; Kennedy-Behr et al., 
2013). The DCDQ-G provides subscale scores in three 
dimensions: Control During Movement, Fine Motor and 
Handwriting, and General Coordination. Summed subscale 
scores yield a global DCD score. Parents were asked to rate 
15 items using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 5 (very much). Higher scores indicate better motor 
skills. Cronbach’s alpha of the scales ranged from .84 to .89 
(α = .89 for Control During Movement, α = .84 for Fine 
Motor and Handwriting, α = .85 for General Coordination, 
and α = .87 for the global DCD score).
Performance-based measure. Motor skills were assessed 
using the German version of the MABC (2nd ed., MABC-
2; Petermann, 2008). The MABC-2 contains eight subtests 
targeting three motor skills, manual dexterity, aiming and 
catching, and balance, and further provides a total motor 
score. Higher scores indicate better motor skills. According 
to Petermann (2008), Cronbach’s alpha for the MABC-2 
ranges from .41 to .62 (α = .52 for manual dexterity, α = 
.41 for aiming and catching, α = .46 for balance, and α = 
.62 for total motor score).
Control variables. Intelligence was measured using the Gen-
eral Ability Index (GAI) of the German version of the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (4th ed., WISC-
IV; Petermann & Petermann, 2011). The GAI consists of 
three verbal comprehension subtests and three perceptual 
reasoning subtests. Different from the Full-Scale IQ, the 
GAI does not include tasks targeting working memory pro-
cesses and processing speed. The German Version of the 
WISC-IV meets standard psychometric properties (Dasek-
ing & Petermann, 2007). Cronbach’s alpha for the WISC-
IV GAI was α = .89. To control for socioeconomic status 
(SES), parents were asked to indicate their highest level of 
education.
Statistical Analysis
In a preliminary step, we conducted partial correlations to 
test associations between parent questionnaires and perfor-
mance-based measures of attention, executive functions, 
and motor skills, respectively. Then, to compare mean dif-
ferences between children with ADHD and controls 
(Hypothesis 1), we conducted multivariate analyses of 
covariance for all measures of attention and executive 
functions (CANTAB; Conners 3) and motor skills (MABC-
2; DCDQ-G). Pairwise comparisons were made using 
Bonferroni post hoc tests. These analyses were controlled 
for SES, children’s intelligence, age, and sex.
Next, to examine impairment-based differences (com-
paring the number of children having an impairment) 
between children with ADHD and controls (Hypothesis 2), 
we conducted χ2 tests or Fisher’s exact tests as indicated. 
We defined impairment on the Conners 3 scales, CANTAB 
tasks, and MABC-2 scales if a child scored below one stan-
dard deviation below the mean of the corresponding norm 
sample. For the DCDQ-G scales we defined impairment as 
any value below the 16th percentile of our control group 
(according to Fried et al., 2015), as they do not have norms.
Finally, to examine the incremental predictive power of 
performance-based measures compared to parent reports, 
we conducted multilevel binary logistic regressions for 
attention/executive functions as well as motor skills and 
with ADHD diagnosis as a dependent variable (ADHD 
diagnosis or no ADHD diagnosis). In Step 1, we entered the 
control variables SES and children’s GAI, age, and sex. In 
Step 2, all parent-rated scales (independent variables) and 
in Step 3, all performance-based tasks (independent vari-
ables) were entered. Multilevel binary logistic regressions 
were conducted using age-standardized values for the 
Conners 3, CANTAB, and MABC-2, since they are gener-
ally used to set a diagnosis.
All tests were two-tailed, and statistical significance was 
defined at the .05 alpha level. We report eta squared (η2) 
values for analyses of variance and odds ratios (ORs) for 
logistic regression analyses.
Little’s missing completely at random test showed that 
missing values were not biased. Thus, we additionally 
imputed the control variables SES and GAI with the expec-
tation maximization algorithm. The results did not change 
significantly when we imputed missing values. Therefore, 
and to enhance power, results with imputed data are reported 
below.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Correlations for inattention and executive functions are 
reported in Table 1 and for motor skills in Table 2. 
Regarding inattention and executive functions, none of the 
parent-rated scales (Conners 3) were significantly related 
to the performance-based tasks (CANTAB), neither on the 
total sample level nor on the group level (ADHD and con-
trols). Fisher’s z transformation revealed that only 1 of 15 
correlations (bold in Table 1) significantly differed 
between the ADHD and the control group. For motor 
skills, on a sample level most correlations between parent 
questionnaire scales (DCDQ-G) and performance-based 
tasks (MABC-2) were significant and ranged from weak 
to strong. Only the performance-based measure of manual 
dexterity was not significantly related to any of the parent-
reported scales. On the group level, correlations were 
mostly stronger for the ADHD than the control group. 
However, Fisher’s z transformation revealed that only 4 of 
28 correlations (bold in Table 2) significantly differed 
between the two groups.
Bünger et al. 5
Mean Comparisons
Table 3 shows the mean differences between children with 
ADHD and controls (Hypothesis 1). Regarding attention 
and executive functions, parents reported higher inattention 
and lower executive function skills (Conners 3) for children 
with ADHD compared to children without ADHD with large 
effect sizes for both inattention (η2 = .50) and executive 
functions (η2 = .35). Regarding performance-based mea-
sures (CANTAB), children with ADHD made more between 
errors on spatial working memory tasks than the control 
group with results indicating a medium effect size (η2 = 
.07). However, there were no significant group differences 
Table 2. Pearson Correlations for Motor Skills.
Scale
DCDQ MABC-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
DCDQ
1. Movement control .53*** .81*** .90*** .15 .59*** .48*** .53***
2. Fine motor skills .28/.55*** .63*** .80*** .14 .20 .18 .23*
3. General coordination .81***/.70*** .28/.70*** .93*** .21 .46*** .51*** .51***
4. Total score 91***/.84*** .57***/.86*** .89***/.92*** .19 .49*** .46*** .49***
MABC-2
5. Manual dexterity .12/–.20 −.12/.03 .05/.00 .04/–.05 .33** .22* .74***
6. Aiming and catching .67***/.19 −.09/.04 .42**/.21 .48**/.17 .16/.42** .36*** .76***
7. Balance .42**/.37* –.20/.23 .38*/.44** .30/.40* .03/.18 .36*/.19 .69***
8. Total score .58***/.06 −.20/.10 .41**/.22 .39*/.15 .57***/.84*** .75***/.76*** .70***/.49***  
Note. Values above the diagonal refer to the overall sample. Values before the solidus (/) refer to the attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder group. 
Values after the solidus (/) refer to the control group. Significant differences between groups appear in bold. Data controlled for socioeconomic status, 
children’s General Ability Index, age, and sex. DCDQ =Developmental Coordination Disorder Questionnaire. MABC-2 = Movement Assessment Bat-
tery for Children, 2nd edition.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Table 3. Mean-Level Differences Between the ADHD Group and Controls.
Scale
ADHD
(n = 52)
Controls
(n = 52)
F p value η2M (SD) M (SD)
Conners 3
 Inattention 10.13 (2.45) 4.36 (2.84) 88.25 <.001 .50
 Executive functions 8.19 (3.30) 3.69 (2.84) 47.07 <.001 .35
CANTAB
 Sustained attention 0.94 (0.04) 0.96 (0.04) 0.839 .362 .01
 Shifting and flexibility of attention 42.33 (21.41) 34.21 (20.92) 1.27 .263 .01
 Spatial planning solved in minimum moves 7.17 (1.75) 7.45 (1.77) 0.03 .855 .00
 Spatial working memory between errors 43.33 (17.71) 32.68 (17.65) 6.53 .012 .07
DCDQ
 Movement control 21.78 (5.19) 26.60 (3.02) 20.22 <.001 .19
 Fine motor skills 11.84 (3.40) 17.22 (2.70) 51.46 <.001 .38
 General coordination 15.04 (4.46) 21.38 (3.06) 47.07 <.001 .36
 Total score 48.67 (10.81) 65.20 (7.53) 53.19 <.001 .39
MABC-2
 Manual dexterity 23.53 (5.93) 28.73 (5.38) 10.86 .001 .10
 Aiming and catching 18.27 (4.93) 21.88 (4.50) 12.57 .001 .12
 Balance 29.73 (5.47) 33.78 (2.63) 13.65 <.001 .13
 Total score 71.55 (11.85) 84.39 (8.65) 25.68 <.001 .22
Note. Data controlled for socioeconomic status, children’s General Ability Index, age, and sex. Conners 3 = Conners Questionnaire for parents, 
3rd edition; CANTAB = Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery; DCDQ = Developmental Coordination Disorder Questionnaire; 
MABC-2 = Movement Assessment Battery for Children, 2nd edition.
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between children with ADHD and controls for all other mea-
sures of attention and executive functions, such as sustained 
attention, shifting and flexibility of attention, and spatial 
planning.
Regarding motor skills, parents reported significantly 
lower skills for children with ADHD on all subscales of the 
DCDQ-G with large effect sizes for movement control (η2 = 
.19), fine motor skills (η2 = .38), general coordination (η2 = 
.36), and the total score (η2 = .39). Moreover, children with 
ADHD had significantly lower scores on performance-based 
motor skill measures (MABC-2) than control children with 
medium effect sizes for manual dexterity (η2 = .10), aiming 
and catching (η2 = .12), and balance (η2 = .13) and a large 
effect size for the total score (η2 = .22).
Impairment Comparisons
Table 4 shows comparisons of the number of children hav-
ing an impairment at T ≥ 60 (1 SD) in the ADHD group and 
the control group (Hypothesis 2). Regarding parent-rated 
inattention (Conners 3), the number of children having an 
impairment was significantly higher in the ADHD group 
(87.5%) than in the control group (20%) with a large effect 
size of η2 = .46. For parent-reported executive functions 
(Conners 3), the number of children having an impairment 
was significantly higher in the ADHD group (65.2%) than 
in the control group (19.5%) with a large effect size of η2 = 
.21. However, when children had to perform tasks measur-
ing attention and executive functions (CANTAB), the num-
ber of children having an impairment was comparable 
between the ADHD group (4% to 24.5%) and the control 
group (0% to 14.6%) on all tasks.
Regarding parent-reported motor skills (DCDQ-G), the 
number of children having an impairment was significantly 
higher in the ADHD group (56.5% to 80.9%) compared to 
the control group (13.3% to 15.6%) with all effect sizes in the 
large range (η2 = .20 to .43). Also for performance-based 
measures of motor skills (MABC-2), the number of children 
having an impairment was significantly higher in the ADHD 
group (18.4% to 51%) than in the control group (0% to 6%) 
with medium effect sizes for manual dexterity (η2 = .12), 
aiming and catching (η2 = –.08), and balance (η2 = .10) and 
a high effect size for the total score (η2 = .17).
When applying stricter cut-off values for impairment defi-
nition, (e.g., 1.5 or 2 standard deviations), results for group 
comparison were almost identical for all attention and execu-
tive function measures (Conners 3 and CANTAB) as well as 
for parent-reported motor skills (DCDQ-G). Only for perfor-
mance-based measures of motor skills (MABC-2), 4 out of 
12 comparisons were not significant when considering also 
stricter cut-off values (percentile 9 and 5) what might be 
explained due to small case numbers (data not shown).
Table 4. Comparisons of Number of Children Having an Impairment in the ADHD Group and the Control Group.
Scale
ADHD Controls
χ2 p value η2n (%) n (%)
Conners 3a
 Inattention 42 (87.5) 9 (20) 42.73 <.001 .46
 Executive functions 30 (65.2) 8 (19.5) 18.41 <.001 .21
CANTABa
 Sustained attention 12 (24.5) 7 (14.6) 1.51 .219 .02
 Shifting and flexibility of attention 2 (4) 0 (0) — .495b .02
 Spatial planning solved in minimum moves 4 (8) 3 (6.3) — 1.000b .00
 Spatial working memory between errors 4 (8.2) 3 (6) — 1.000b .00
DCDQc
 Movement control 26 (56.5) 6 (13.3) 18.61 <.001 .20
 Fine motor skills 31 (67.4) 6 (13.3) 27.56 <.001 .30
 General coordination 31 (66) 6 (13.3) 26.48 <.001 .29
 Total score 38 (80.9) 7 (15.6) 39.22 <.001 .43
MABC-2a
 Manual dexterity 25 (51) 9 7.(6) 12.40 <.001 .12
 Aiming and catching 11 (22.4) 2 (3.9) 7.59 .006 .08
 Balance 9 (18.4) 0 (0) — .001b .10
 Total score 18 (36.7) 2 (3.9) 16.82 <.001 .17
Note. Conners 3 = Conners Questionnaire for parents, 3rd edition; CANTAB = Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery; DCDQ = 
Developmental Coordination Disorder Questionnaire; MABC-2 = Movement Assessment Battery for Children, 2nd edition.
aImpairment defined as 1 SD below the age-standardized average.
bFisher’s exact test.
cImpairment defined as value below the 16th percentile of the control group.
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Incremental Predictive Power of Performance-
Based Measures Over Parent Reports
Tables 5 and 6 show the predictive power of attention and 
executive functions as well as motor skills for ADHD 
diagnosis. Regarding control variables, GAI was a signifi-
cant negative predictor of an ADHD diagnosis with a 
small effect size of OR = .95. SES and children’s age and 
sex did not significantly predict the presence of an ADHD 
diagnosis.
Regarding attention and executive functions, parent-
reported inattention significantly predicted the presence of 
an ADHD diagnosis, with a small effect size of OR = 
1.37. Parent-reported executive function did not signifi-
cantly predict the presence of an ADHD diagnosis. 
Furthermore, none of the subsequently entered perfor-
mance-based measures showed significant predictive 
power beyond that of parent questionnaires. Also, when 
performance-based measures of attention and executive 
functions were entered first in the statistical analyses (Step 
1), none of these measures showed significant predictive 
power (data not shown).
Regarding motor skills, parent-reported fine motor 
skills and general coordination were significant negative 
predictors of an ADHD diagnosis, with small effect sizes 
for both fine motor skills (OR = .70) and general coordi-
nation (OR = .71). However, parent-reported movement 
control did not significantly predict the presence of an 
ADHD diagnosis. Furthermore, none of the subsequently 
entered performance-based measures showed significant 
predictive power beyond that of parent questionnaires. 
When performance-based measures of motor skills were 
entered first in the statistical analyses (Step 1), only bal-
ance resulted as a significant negative predictor (B = –.24, 
p = .039) with a small effect size of OR = .79.
Table 5. Multilevel Binary Logistic Regression Comparing Parent Questionnaires and Performance-Based Measures of Attention and 
Executive Functions as Predictors of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Diagnosis.
Regression step B p value OR
95% CI for OR
ORmin ORmax
Step 1
 SES −0.22 .188 0.80 0.57 1.11
 GAI −0.06 .011 0.95 0.91 0.99
 Sex 0.03 .959 1.03 0.31 3.45
Step 2
 Inattentiona 0.31 .001 1.37 1.14 1.65
 Executive functionsa 0.10 .128 1.10 0.97 1.25
Step 3
 Sustained attentionb −1.06 .075 0.35 0.11 1.11
 Shifting and flexibility of attentionb −1.17 .113 0.31 0.07 1.32
 Spatial planning solved in minimum movesb 0.71 .426 2.02 0.36 11.46
 Spatial working memory between errorsb −2.46 .050 0.085 0.01 1.00
Note. OR = Odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; ORmin = Lower value of the 95% CI for OR; ORmax = Higher value of the 95% CI for OR; SES = 
Socioeconomic status; GAI = General Ability Index; Conners 3 = Conners Questionnaire for parents, 3rd edition; CANTAB = Cambridge Neuropsy-
chological Test Automated Battery.
aConners 3 scales, age-standardized values.
bCANTAB tasks, age-standardized values.
Table 6. Multilevel Binary Logistic Regression Comparing 
Parent Questionnaires and Performance-Based Measures of 
Motor Skills as Predictors of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity 
Disorder Diagnosis.
Regression step B p value OR
95% CI for OR
ORmin ORmax
Step 1
 SES −0.19 .262 0.83 0.60 1.15
 GAI −0.06 .011 0.95 0.91 0.99
 Sex 0.11 .849 1.11 0.37 3.38
Step 2
 Movement controla 0.06 .666 1.06 0.82 1.37
 Fine motor skillsa −0.36 .003 0.70 0.55 0.88
 General coordinationa −0.31 .014 0.73 0.57 0.94
Step 3
 Manual dexterityb −0.23 .171 0.80 0.58 1.10
 Aiming and catchingb −0.22 .234 0.80 0.56 1.15
 Balanceb −0.16 .372 0.85 0.60 1.22
Note. OR = Odds ratio; CI = confidence interval; ORmin Lower value of 
the 95% CI for OR; ORmax = Higher value of the 95% CI for OR; SES = 
Socioeconomic status; GAI = General Ability Index; DCDQ = Develop-
mental Coordination Disorder Questionnaire; MABC-2 = Movement 
Assessment Battery for Children, 2nd edition.
aDCDQ scales, raw scores.
bMABC-2 tasks, age-standardized values.
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Discussion
The goal of this study was to shed light on differences in 
attention, executive functions, and motor difficulties 
between children with ADHD and controls and whether 
these symptoms are comparably revealed using different 
methods.
In line with Hypotheses 1 and 2, we found group differ-
ences regarding parent reports (Conners 3), with lower 
attention and executive functions in children with ADHD 
and more children showing an impairment in the ADHD 
compared to the control group. Our results are consistent 
with findings from Lidzba and colleagues (2013), who found 
differences in attention and executive functions based on the 
Conners 3 scales on a mean level as well as regarding the 
number of children having an impairment. In addition, we 
found significant mean-level differences on the CANTAB 
performance-based Spatial Working Memory subtest, which 
is in line with previous research that used other neuropsy-
chological tasks and found working memory to be robustly 
impaired in children with ADHD (Martinussen, Hayden, 
Hogg-Johnson, & Tannock, 2005; Walshaw, Alloy, & Sabb, 
2010; Willcutt et al., 2005). In contrast to our first hypothe-
sis we did not find mean-level differences between the two 
groups regarding CANTAB performance-based sustained 
attention (RVP), shifting and flexibility of attention (IED), 
and spatial planning (SOC). Conversely, previous studies 
reported significant mean-level differences to the disadvan-
tage of ADHD children for shifting and flexibility of atten-
tion (IED; Claesdotter, Cervin, Åkerlund, Råstam, & 
Lindvall, 2018; Fried et al., 2015; Gau & Shang, 2010) as 
well as for sustained attention (RVP) and spatial planning 
(SOC; Fried et al., 2015). Thus, they concluded that the 
CANTAB is a valuable instrument in the diagnostic assess-
ment of ADHD. The inconsistency between our findings and 
previous results might be partially explained by differences 
in study design. Whereas Fried and colleagues (2015) and 
Claesdotter and colleagues (2018) tested children within a 
comparable age range to our study, they did not control for 
general cognitive ability. Gau and Shang (2010) did control 
for intelligence, but they examined older participants aged 
11 to 17 years. Furthermore, inconsistent test reliability of 
CANTAB tasks could also partially explain divergent find-
ings: Whereas Luciana (2003) reported high internal consis-
tency coefficients (.73 to .95), Syväoja and colleagues 
(2015) found low internal consistency for most CANTAB 
tasks (< .70), with both samples involving school-aged 
children.
Moreover, the number of children having an impairment 
did not differ between the ADHD and the control group 
regarding all four CANTAB measures, which is mostly in 
line with Fried and colleagues (2015). However, they found 
a higher number of children having an impairment on sus-
tained attention in the ADHD group.
Our finding that differences in the number of impaired 
children are significant for parent reports but not for perfor-
mance-based measures is also consistent with evidence from 
other traditional tests. McAuley, Chen, Goos, Schachar, and 
Crosbie (2010) concluded that a higher number of children 
show clinically relevant impairment using BRIEF parent 
reports compared to performance-based measures of execu-
tive functions. This finding seems to be independent of the 
type of clinical disorder (Drechsler & Steinhausen, 2013). A 
possible explanation for divergent findings between parent 
reports and performance-based measures may be that they do 
not fully measure the same skills of attention and executive 
functions. Whereas the Conners 3 questionnaire yields one 
general value of executive functions that also involves ques-
tions targeting behavioral and emotional aspects, the four 
performance-based CANTAB tasks differentiate between 
several subcomponents and exclusively target cognitive pro-
cesses. In addition, questionnaires are more prone to reflect 
complex everyday situations whereas performance-based 
measures assess attention and executive functions in a more 
isolated manner due to the laboratory setting (Luciana, 2003). 
Specifically, diagnosticians try to set up optimal and unim-
peded test situations, while parents might also think of chal-
lenging situations when completing questionnaires.
Regarding motor skills, we found significant group dif-
ferences with worse motor skills and more children having 
an impairment in the ADHD compared to the control group 
for both the parent-rated DCDQ-G and the performance-
based MABC-2 scales. These results are in line with prior 
research (Fliers et al., 2008; Piek et al., 1999).
Our results reveal that parent questionnaires and perfor-
mance-based measures are more comparable for motor 
skills than for attention and executive functions, which was 
also revealed in stronger correlations between parent ques-
tionnaires and performance-based measures in motor skills 
than in attention and executive functions. In a similar vein, 
studies assessing the agreement between father and mother 
questionnaire ratings found higher agreement rates for 
behavior-based aspects such as hyperactivity than for more 
cognitive aspects such as inattention (Caye et al., 2017). 
Results derived from our study now add to this finding that 
there is also a higher agreement between questionnaires and 
performance-based measures for developmental behavioral 
symptoms compared to cognitive symptoms. This may be 
because motor skills occur in a more explicit behavior than 
cognitive abilities, which in turn are more internally ori-
ented and manifest themselves in more subtle behavior 
(Caye et al., 2017). Therefore, it might be easier for parents 
to rate their children’s motor skills more accurately than the 
less visible cognitive abilities. Another explanation might 
be that for motor skills, parent questionnaires and perfor-
mance-based measures effectively target the same construct 
whereas this might not entirely be the case for attention and 
executive functions, as previously discussed.
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Regarding our research question, we found no significant 
incremental predictive validity for performance-based mea-
sures of attention, executive functions, and motor skills com-
pared to parent reports. Multilevel binary regression analysis 
showed that parent-reported difficulties in attention and 
motor skills (except movement control), but not performance-
based measures, were related to the presence of an ADHD 
diagnosis. To understand this result, one has to bear in mind 
that ICD-10 and DSM-IV criteria allow diagnosticians to base 
an ADHD diagnosis on questionnaires without using perfor-
mance-based measures but not vice versa. Therefore, it is 
possible that diagnosticians more often relied on question-
naires including parent reports than on performance-based 
measures when giving the diagnosis, which could increase 
the predictive validity of parent questionnaires.
The inconsistent reliability of the CANTAB subtests 
could also have contributed to the fact that they did not show 
a predictive value for the presence of an ADHD diagnosis in 
our study. Yet, we used CANTAB as a performance-based 
measure for attention and executive functions because previ-
ous studies reported that the CANTAB subtests are suitable 
for determining deficits in attention and executive functions 
in children with ADHD (Fried et al., 2015; Gau & Shang, 
2010). Moreover, there are still very few standardized test 
batteries in German-speaking countries that explicitly mea-
sure the executive functions of school-aged children, even 
though research shows how important the concept of execu-
tive functions is for academic achievement as well as health 
(Best, Miller, & Naglieri, 2011; Moffitt et al., 2011), espe-
cially in the context of an ADHD diagnosis (Willcutt et al., 
2005). In 2018, the Intelligence and Development Scales–2 
(Grob & Hagmann-von Arx, 2018), a newly developed per-
formance-based paper-and-pencil test battery measuring 
attention and executive functions, became available for 
German-speaking children and adolescents. Future research 
examining other parent questionnaires and performance-
based measures will reveal whether the lack of correspon-
dence is a general issue or caused by a possible bias of parent 
reports and/or possible unreliability of computerized tests. 
Finally, we suggest that it may be essential for practitioners 
to know the children’s performance in a standardized test 
situation beyond the symptoms reported by the child, the 
parents, or others in order to gain a comprehensive picture of 
the strengths and difficulties of a child, to design an indi-
vidualized treatment plan, and to draw direct comparisons 
between children.
Limitations
Our study has some limitations. First, we relied on the diag-
nosis given by experienced practicing pediatricians and 
were therefore not able to control for the standardization of 
the diagnostic process. Second, the interpretation of ques-
tionnaires is limited to parental perceptions of children’s 
attention, executive functions, and motor skills, as teacher 
ratings and the child’s perspective were not included in this 
study. Third, we focused on attention, executive functions, 
and motor skills, but there are other coexisting symptoms, 
such as socioemotional difficulties, that often accompany an 
ADHD diagnosis and play an important role in psychologi-
cal well-being. Finally, for performance-based measures of 
attention and executive functions we used only computer-
based tasks. Future research could also include multimethod 
tests of socioemotional difficulties as well as performance-
based measures of executive functions and attention that are 
based on paper-and-pencil or interaction tasks.
Conclusion
In sum, children with ADHD have more difficulties in 
attention, executive functions, and motor skills and are 
more often impaired in these skills compared to controls. 
Whereas parent questionnaires and performance-based 
measures reveal comparable results regarding differences in 
motor skills between children with ADHD and controls, 
only parent questionnaires reveal differences in attention 
and executive functions between the two groups. We pro-
pose applying parent questionnaires as well as performance-
based measures in order to better understand a child’s needs 
and to design an individualized treatment plan, since it is 
possible that parent questionnaires and performance-based 
measures regarding attention and executive functions do 
not completely target the same construct.
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